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ABSTRACT 
Many components come together to form not only the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), but the larger homeland security enterprise across the country. State, local and 
tribal assets are part of the fabric of homeland security efforts, along with federal entities, 
in prevention, response and recovery. While immigration enforcement at the federal level 
was formally brought into DHS, state, local and tribal (SLT) enforcement agencies are 
potential partners in that effort, as pointed out in the 9/11 Commission Report. 
This thesis outlines some of the legal authorities for the use of local agencies, the 
diversity of approach and opinion in these efforts, and a cross-section of agency policies 
and SLT ordinances that direct enforcement efforts. Using a Policy Options analysis 
framework, SLT agency policies were examined and evaluated in five areas: 
effectiveness, legality, acceptability, efficiency, and implementation.   
Based on this research, it is apparent that not only is there a disparity of opinion 
and approach to immigration enforcement, there is a lack of any policy at all for a 
majority of agencies. Recommendations for enforcement efforts include not only the 
importance of forming a policy, but doing so in a collaborative way, including federal, 
SLT and community partners. 
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Elemental to the homeland security effort is a robust and reasonable approach to 
immigration enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a key agency in the 
Department of Homeland Security. Beyond federal efforts, however, there is what the 
9/11 Commission Report described as a “growing role” for State, Local and Tribal law 
enforcement agencies to participate and cooperate in immigration enforcement. Federal 
law and a myriad of court decisions and legal opinions reflect authority for local 
involvement in immigration enforcement, but to what level that authority extends is by no 
means clear. Some state and local governments have attempted to clarify or add to 
immigration enforcement options through legislation. This has largely grown from 
frustration over lack of federal legislative reform efforts. The Supreme Court weighed in 
with a 2012 decision making it clear that drafting immigration law is a federal purview, 
but finding that requiring state or local law enforcement to participate in enforcement 
could come from state houses. With the issue still clouded, the question for many local 
agencies remains: “What the hell do we do now?” 
This thesis reviews a cross-section of agency policy options and approaches to 
immigration enforcement across the country. Broadly,  policies that currently exist reflect 
two basic approaches - directed enforcement policies in which officers or deputies 
actively participate in immigration enforcement through some means, also cooperating 
with federal authorities; and non-cooperative/sanctuary policies which limit or eliminate 
officers’ or deputies’ ability to participate in immigration enforcement or cooperate with 
federal enforcement. The issue of immigration and its enforcement is politically and 
socially charged. Generally each of these policy positions is reflective of a political 
climate, certain constituencies or advocacy groups, or a combination of these in a given 
region or municipality. Difficult to find, though not completely absent, is an approach to 
immigration enforcement at a local level that was collaborative and sought consensus 
among interest groups, enforcement agencies at the local and federal level, and the 
community. Using the policy options analysis framework, these policies are compared. 
 xiv
Collaborative policy is described and determined to best meet the evaluative criteria of 
effectiveness, legality, acceptability, efficiency and implementation. 
Noteworthy in the research is the lack of immigration enforcement policy 
amongst the majority of local law enforcement agencies. Over half maintain no policy at 
all. Key among recommendations described in this work is the need for agencies to have 
a policy, collaboratively formed, to address enforcement efforts. Law enforcement 
agencies cannot wonder what to do next if they have done nothing to address the issue 
where they can. Agencies should look to build relationships amongst affected groups and 
communities and build new, innovative approaches to immigration enforcement. 
 xv
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The June 2012 split decision ruling by the United States Supreme Court with 
regard to the State of Arizona’s controversial Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070)1 may have 
clarified certain aspects of state laws and enforcement of immigration by state, local and 
tribal (SLT) police agencies—particularly in Arizona. The ruling, however, provided no 
further clarity about the extent SLT agencies should or can involve themselves with 
immigration enforcement, nor guidance towards any best practices or policy. Likely, it 
could not, or was not, intended to. SB 1070 and the period leading up to the ruling put the 
immigration enforcement debate very much in the national consciousness. 
The Supreme court struck down provisions of Arizona’ SB1070 that; made it a 
misdemeanor not to comply with federal alien registration requirements; made it a 
misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; and that 
authorized warrantless arrest in Arizona of anyone that the officer has probable cause to 
believe has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the 
United States.2  The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law 
and that was at the heart of the decision of those provisions along with the Federal 
Government’s power of immigration.3  The Court left in place the provision of the law 
that the state’s requirement that a subject’s immigration status be checked during a stop, 
detention or arrest. However, it left in question whether this practice would 
unconstitutionally delay the detainees’ release.4 
                                                 
1. Senate Bill 1070, Arizona, 2010 Titled the “Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act,” it was more commonly referred to as simply SB 1070. The passage of SB 1070 and subsequent state 
and national debate that ensued, highlighted the immigration issue and what were appropriate measures to 
respond to it. As originally enacted, SB 1070 made it a misdemeanor for an alien to be in Arizona without 
appropriate documentation, prohibited state, county and local officials from restricting or  immigration 
enforcement (providing for legal action if they did so), restricted day-labor type hiring activities and 
transportation of illegal aliens, and obligated police to determine a person’s immigration status during a 
lawful stop, or detention or arrest if there was reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien. It is 
the last portion regarding those police actions that the U.S. Supreme Court left in place.  
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf. 
2. United State Supreme Court, Arizona, et al. v. United States No. 11-182, June 25, 2012, 2–4, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11–182b5e1.pdf. 
3. Ibid., 1–2. 
4. Ibid. 
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The basic parameters for SLT immigration enforcement are still not entirely clear 
or understood. Direction for SLT agencies, policies and best practices vary markedly 
across the country resulting in what has been likened to a “crazy quilt running the gamut 
from requiring local police departments to enforce federal immigration law, to expressly 
prohibiting local law enforcement in so-called “sanctuary” communities from 
cooperating with their federal counterparts”5  
This work examines the role of state and local law enforcement in immigration 
enforcement, and applicable laws and authorities, particularly in the interior of the United 
States. It will discuss what is known, where there is confusion, disagreement or dissent, 
as well as portions of the “crazy quilt” exhibited in SLT agency and government policies 
where they exist. Further, it is the intent of the researcher to look for and examine 
elements of various approaches, and where gaps exist, to consider new and innovative 
approaches to the issue.   
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What the Hell Do We Do Now? 
Given basic opposing views on the topic, which this thesis will discuss, what type 
of policy should be considered for adoption and implementation by state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement? Mixed messages and interpretations of federal immigration laws and 
court decisions abound as do opinions of advocacy groups, legal professionals, scholars 
and others. How does state, local and tribal law enforcement contend with immigration 
enforcement responsibilities/authority and maintain sound community policing 
relationships? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
There is distinct lack of continuity amongst state, local and tribal law enforcement 
across the United States in their interpretation and application of federal immigration 
laws and policies. Moreover, states like Arizona have enacted laws enhancing 
                                                 
5. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), “Critical Issues in Policing Series: Police Chiefs and 
Sheriff’s Speak Out On Local Immigration Enforcement,” April 2008, 5, 
http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Immigration%28$25%29.pdf. 
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immigration enforcement at the state and local level, while California is considering law 
to diminish law enforcement’s cooperation in such enforcement.6  Efforts of officers and 
deputies in the field and in local jails are inconsistent across the nation in this area.7 
Absent consistent direction nationally, law enforcement officers, agencies and the 
communities they serve struggle to balance enforcement efforts, homeland security 
concerns, and positive relations, particularly among immigrant communities.  
Some state and local jurisdictions may have implemented practices that may be 
beneficial in advancing the discussion towards best practices in balancing the above 
concerns.8  Innovative collaborative approaches in other issues facing SLT enforcement 
agencies, like realignment of offender populations for example, have been, and are being 
developed that may lend themselves to the ongoing discussion of immigration 
enforcement, so salient an issue in virtually every part of the country. 9 
This research will examine origins of the issue—how we got here, legal 
considerations, and policies considered and/or in use. Providing a vantage point that 
separates itself from political concerns, past practice and other limiters, it will seek to 
objectively evaluate possibilities for state, local and tribal law enforcement to consider in 
an effort to reach sound immigration enforcement policy and best practices.   
SLT law enforcement agencies have an integral role to play and unique 
capabilities in the homeland security arena. Immigration enforcement is a key component 
to homeland security efforts as discussed in the 9/11 Commission Report. Cooperation in 
immigration enforcement efforts, at virtually any/every level by SLT law enforcement, 
                                                 
6. Tom Amiano, 2011, AB 1081, (vetoed by Gov. Brown, September 2012, amended and  re-
introduced as AB 4 in December 2012). 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB1081&search_keywords=
.  & United States Supreme Court, Arizona, et al. v. United States No. 11–182, June 25, 2012, 2–4. 
7. Debra A. Hoffmaster, Gerard Murphy, Shannon McFadden, and Molly Griswold, “Police and 
Immigration: How Chiefs Are Leading their Communities through the Challenges,” Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) 2010, iii. 
http://www.policeforum.org/library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf. 
8. Ibid. 
.9. Contra Costa County, AB 109 Operational Plan,  http://www.co.contra-
costa.ca.us/index.aspx?NID=3113. 
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enflames controversy among stakeholders. A collaborative approach towards best 
practices is desirable and could contribute to the discourse. 
C. METHODOLGICAL STRUCTURE 
Using the Policy Options framework, this work will examine current policies, 
local legislation and enforcement activities of SLT enforcement jurisdictions to determine 
possible options or blend of options provide a potential collaborative model for best 
practices for policy and enforcement. 
1. Object/Unit of Study 
Enforcement or Policy guideline - Interpretation and subsequent application of 
Federal law and policies by state, local, and tribal law enforcement is disjointed and 
inconsistent. 
2. Sample Selection   
This thesis will look at SLT law enforcement policies/procedures and opinions 
towards federal legislation, U.S. Court decisions, state initiatives and even local or 
regional political/governmental authorities. 
3. Data Sources 
Data will be taken from literature, as well as existing law and policies; potentially 
also from primary sources like internal documents, expert/policy-maker input. 
4. Type of Analysis 
The research will utilize the “Policy Option Analysis” method, examining the 
issue through the steps outlined in lecture and texts:  Defining the Problem; Examining 
Alternative Solutions; Selecting Criteria for Judging Success; Projecting the Outcomes 
from Alternative Solutions; Analyzing  Outcomes; ultimately Choosing the Best  
Solution and Explaining the Recommendation. Relevant criteria will include—
effectiveness, legality, acceptability (by communities and enforcement), efficiency, and 
implementation.   
5. Output 
This thesis will represent policies, processes or potential best practices that would 
be applicable to state, local and tribal law enforcement policy efforts. This thesis is for 
use by readers to assist in the development of local/regional policies. 
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D. OVERVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS 
Option 1: Vigorous immigration enforcement by SLT Law Enforcement under 
existing constraints – laws, decisions, and government codes 
Option 2: Do not participate in immigration enforcement. Leave any processing 
of potential immigration violation/violators to the federal authorities.    
Option  3:  Seek a more collaborative and innovative approach among SLT 
enforcement agencies, SLT governments and authorities, community groups and other 
stakeholders, to gain guidance and for formulation of a better policy and better 
approach/”best practices” to the issue. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
State and local law enforcement personnel continue to assist in the effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks in a critical way to protect American citizens.10  The literature 
highlights there is still much debate and disagreement about local law enforcement’s role 
with some assets and activities of the DHS, particularly in immigration enforcement. The 
9/11 Commission report cites immigration services as a way of reaching out to immigrant 
communities to include gaining intelligence. It also says there is a growing role for state 
and local law enforcement agencies in that area.11 This review examines relevant 
literature concerning local law enforcement’s legal authority and responsibility in 
immigration enforcement, disagreement or lack of clarity on the issue, as well as gaps 
that may need further research. 
A. SITUATION: FORCE MULTIPLIERS AND FIRST PREVENTERS 
Literature outlines the critical intervention of routine law enforcement and its 
potential ability to thwart incidents. In his article “State and Local Law Enforcement 
Contributions to Terrorism Prevention” Special Agent William McCormack, J.D., 
outlines several such cases.12  In 1988 a New Jersey Trooper discovered several bombs in 
a van after observing the unusual behavior of a suspect near the vehicle on the New 
Jersey Turnpike. In 1997 a roommate of would-be terrorists informed New York officers 
of their bomb-making and plans to detonate them. In 1995, an off-duty Detective 
Sergeant working a second job in Iredell County, North Carolina observed and reported 
money-laundering activities via a tobacco shop. He reported it to the Bureau of Alcohol 
Tobacco and Firearms (with the FBI subsequently becoming involved). The case led to 
the arrest of the perpetrators for funding Hezbollah.   
                                                 
10. William McCormack, “State and Local Law Enforcement Contributions to Terrorism Prevention,” 
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, March 2009, 7, http://leb.fbi.gov/2009-pdfs/leb-march-2009. 
11.  Thomas Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, Richard Ben-Veniste, Bob Kerrey, John F. Lehman Fred 
Fielding, Jamie S Gorelick, Timothy J. Roemer, Slade Gorton, and James R.Thompson, “The 9/11 
Commission Report,” 390. 
12.  McCormack, “State and Local Law Enforcement Contributions,” 2–4. 
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The same principle might be true in immigration enforcement. As pointed out in 
Congressional testimony by Dr. Kris Kobach, assistance of state and local law 
enforcement agencies can mean the difference between success and failure in enforcing 
the immigration laws. There are approximately 18,000 agencies with more than 800,000 
SLT police officers nationwide.13 This represents a massive force multiplier.14  These 
and other similar examples reaffirm local law enforcement’s status on the front lines 
potentially impacting homeland security and immigration enforcement. 
B. NATURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DUTIES 
By nature of their duties, law enforcement officers often become “first preventers, 
rather than first responders.”15  It has been documented that contact during these duties 
can reveal potential issues that concern immigration related issues. Dr. Kris Kobach 
writes that four of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were contacted, and some cited, during 
traffic stops while in the U.S., prior to the hijackings.16 Mohamed Atta was stopped twice 
in 2001; Hanji Hanjour was cited in August 2001; Ziad Jarrah was stopped just two days 
before hijackings, for speeding on September 9, 2001,17 and Nawaf al Hazmi was 
stopped for speeding in April, 2001.18 In two of the cases, Jarrah and Hazmi were in 
violation of immigration laws, at least civilly, due to improper listing of immigrant status. 




                                                 
13. Brian A. Reaves, “Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,” USDOJ, July 
2011, 2, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf. 
14.United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Kris Kobach, April 22, 2000, 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281ff81547&wit_id
=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281ff81547–1–1. 
15. McCormack, “State and Local Law Enforcement Contributions,” 5. 
16. Kris W. Kobach, The Heritage Foundation, “Terrorist Loophole: Senate Bill Disarms Law 
Enforcement” Web Memo, 1092 May 24, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/terrorist-
loophole-senate-bill-disarms-law-enforcement. 
17. McCormack, “State and Local Law Enforcement Contributions,” 5–6. 
18. Kobach, “Terrorist Loophole.”  
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the six-month visa limit which expired in July 2000.19 Law enforcement officers do not 
seem to have the knowledge, training or policy to conduct follow-up on immigration 
related issues.20 
What the literature in these cases reveals is the fact that state and local law 
enforcement officers encounter people and situations that overlap immigration and 
homeland security issues. Law enforcement officers patrol every community, every day. 
They know their areas. They can spot people, things, and behavior that are out of the 
ordinary.21 
C. DOCUMENTED DISAGREEMENT IN PRACTICE 
There is a wide disparity outlined in interpretation of federal immigration laws, 
state and local law enforcements’ role in enforcing those laws and side-effects of an 
enhanced local role in immigration enforcement. 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published a somewhat 
sweeping statement in a 2004 position paper indicating, that state, local and tribal police 
are not required to enforce federal immigration laws. (emphasis kept from the original 
document). The IACP maintained that the federal government and its agencies are the 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of immigration law.22 
There are suspiciously few laws or precedents in the research and literature by 
which state and local law enforcement can adopt a strategy in relation to immigration 
enforcement.   
In 1983, the United States 9th Circuit Court ruled, in Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 
that local law enforcement could enforce criminal provisions of federal immigration law, 
                                                 
19. Ibid., 1–2. 
20. Ibid., 2. 
21. James R. Edwards, “Officers Need Backup: The Role of State and Local Police in Immigration 
Enforcement,” Center for Immigration Studies. http://www.cis.org/State%2526LocalPolice-
ImmigrationLawEnforcement. 
22. Gene Voegtlin, International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Enforcing Immigration Law: The 
Role of State, Tribal and Local Law Enforcement,” 2004, 2, 
http://www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/Topicalindex/tabid/216/Default.aspx?id=553&v=1. 
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specifically enumerating 8 U.S.C 1325. That section makes it a federal misdemeanor to 
enter the United States at a time or place other than designated by immigration officers; 
to elude examination or inspection by immigration officers; or to enter, or attempt to 
enter, the United States by willfully false or misleading representation or willful 
concealment of a material fact.23 While this gives guidance and makes allowance for 
criminal enforcement of immigration law, the readings indicate application can vary. 
Some states, for example, require misdemeanors to be committed in an officer’s presence 
to allow for arrest—so the decision/federal law would not be applicable nor detention and 
arrest allowable. The Gonzalez case is germane to this issue. In most cited cases, 
immigration enforcement came about in the context of enforcing criminal matters,24 the 
core of Gonzalez.   
The limitation for enforcement of criminal immigration violations by state and 
local authorities was broadened somewhat (and perhaps muddied as well) by a case in the 
10th Circuit Court in 2001—U.S. vs. Santana-Garcia. A Utah officer stopped and 
subsequently arrested two motorists who said they were driving to Colorado. When asked 
if they were in the U.S. legally, they answered “no” during that questioning. The court 
upheld their arrest. Despite the defendants’ violation being a civil one (illegal presence), 
the court found that state officers possess “implicit authority” or “general investigative 
authority” to inquire into possible immigration violations.25 
Despite that, it is documented in the literature that immigration related issues are 
vested in the federal government via documentation to include the Constitution, U.S. 
Code, the Immigration and Naturalization Act and other authorities. However, law 
enforcement officers swear an oath to uphold the law—to include the U.S. Constitution, 
which implies federal laws.26  It may not be a question of requirement to enforcement but 
                                                 
23. Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law Review, “The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line,” 2011, Vol. 58, no. 6: 1823–1824, 
http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/58–6–10.pdf. 
24. Lisa M. Seghetti, Karma Ester, and Michael John Garcia, Congressional Research Service, 
“Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement,” 8. 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=37589. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Edwards, “Officers Need Backup,” 6. 
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perhaps a duty to enforce. The Department of Justice published an opinion in 1996 
indicating, that law enforcement officers are permitted to enforce federal statutes 
providing those activities do not impair federal regulatory interest.27 
Michael Garcia of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) for Department Justice 
wrote an opinion for the OLC in 2002 that seems to take enforcement a step farther. It 
said states were like the federal government and possessed the status of sovereign 
entities. So, states do not require delegation of federal authority in order to make arrests 
for violations of federal law—that power is inherent in on sovereign to accommodate the 
interests of another.28 
DHS’ literature designed to provide guidance to state and local enforcement 
actions does little to provide great clarity. The literature outlines three basic ways in 
which state or local law enforcement is authorized to involve themselves with 
immigration enforcement actions. In summary, the first (actually two different items) 
allows state and local law enforcement to be involved in criminal (emphasis added) 
immigration violations per U.S. Code (8USC, 1324(c)) or when there is an “actual or 
imminent mass influx of aliens” local authorities may act as federal immigration 
officers.29  
The same publication discusses two other ways that state and local agencies are 
authorized to act, outside of the above, on immigration issues. One is under written 
agreement between the agency and DHS, enlisting voluntary assistance relating to 
investigation and enforcement of immigration laws and violations. The agreements are 
routinely referred to as 287(g) agreements based on the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act, found in 8 USC 1357(g)(1).30 Agencies cooperating with DHS under this agreement 
                                                 
27. Ibid., 6 
28. Michael J Garcia, and Kate Manuel, Congressional Research Service, “Authority of State and 
Local Police to Enforce Federal Immigration Law,” September 10, 2012, 19, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41423.pdf. 
29. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance 
in Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters,” September 21, 2011, 6, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-assistance-immigration-enforcement.pdf. 
30. Ibid., 7. 
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are required to have participating officers qualify to perform immigration officer 
functions via training and knowledge of federal immigration laws. Local agencies are 
essentially minting Immigrations level officers from their own personnel. 
A second authorization discussed comes from the concept of ‘cooperation’ with 
the DHS, which it defines as rendering of assistance by state and local officers to federal 
officials, in enforcement of the INA. These state and local officers must be responsive to 
the direction and guidance of federal officials charged with enforcing the immigration 
laws.31 
Functionally, this cooperation takes the form of officers from state or local 
agencies working on a task force with the DHS, assisting DHS immigration in the service 
of search warrants, provision of facilities to DHS, granting access to facilities for 
identifying detained aliens, or similar joint efforts.32  
DHS makes it clear that it maintains primacy in immigration enforcement and 
state or local efforts take place under DHS’s guidance. The literature outlines numerous 
actions that it deems impermissible by state and/or local agencies. While not inclusive of 
all possibilities, the list is lengthy. Impermissible actions include establishing immigrant 
removal or entry policies in the U.S., adding criteria or tasks for aliens to stay in the U.S., 
referring large numbers of certain classes of aliens to DHS and burdening DHS limited 
resources.33 
Key among the impermissible acts, given the current actions by some state and 
local governments, is requiring state or local law enforcement officer inquire into the 
immigration status of a specified group or category of individuals.34  In Virginia, Prince 
William County (PWC) Supervisors passed resolutions in 2007 seemingly in 
contradiction to the DHS provision. The PWC Board required staff to withhold as many 
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County services as possible from illegal immigrants. It also required that if an officer had 
probable cause, to inquire into a person’s immigration status during all detentions, 
including traffic stops.35 
Similarly in recent articles, and at the crux of the case in front of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2012, was Arizona’s SB 1070, from 2010. While other provisions were 
struck down, this portion of Arizona’s law was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court its 
decision, allowing the requirement that police officers stopping someone make efforts to 
verify the person’s immigration status with the federal government.36 
These are only two isolated, if not celebrated, examples at state or local 
legislation in the literature to increase SLT involvement in immigration enforcement. 
They are clearly not the only examples. In a report from the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) in 2008, the first six months of 2007, saw 41 states passing immigration 
related measures. The situation nationally goes from requiring local police departments to 
enforce federal immigration law, to expressly prohibiting local law enforcement in so-
called “sanctuary” communities from cooperating with their federal agencies.37  
An example in the literature on the ‘sanctuary’ side of the discussion is Takoma 
Park, Maryland. The town has had a sanctuary ordinance since 1985. In a 2007 renewal, 
the town struck down a recommended provision allowing officers to contact ICE if a 
subject has a federal immigration warrant in the FBI’s National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) database.38   
                                                 
35. Thomas M. Guterbock, Christopher S. Koper, Milton Vickerman, Bruce Taylor, Karen Walker, 
Timothy Carter, and Abdoulaye Diop, Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Center for Survey 
Research, University of Virginia (2009), “Evaluation Study of Prince William County Police Illegal 
Immigration Enforcement Policy: Interim Report,” 
http://www.virginia.edu/surveys/Projects/2010/PWC09_Immigration/Interim%20Report.Final.pdf.  
36. Tom Curry, “High Court Strikes Down Key Parts of Arizona Immigration Law,” NBC News, June 
25, 2012, http://nbcpolitics.msnbc.msn.com/_news/.  
37. PERF, “Critical Issues in Policing Series: Police Chiefs and Sheriff’s Speak Out On Local 
Immigration Enforcement,” 5. 
38. Ibid., 6. 
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Chief of Police in Takoma Park, Ronald Ricucci, indicated that his officers cannot 
talk with or cooperate with ICE.39 Such measures would seem to fly in the face of U.S. 
Code authority to deal with criminal aliens discussed above. 
D. INCONCLUSIVENESS IN THE DISCUSSION 
These attempts at legislation illustrate the level of confusion and legal 
disagreement in the literature on the issue of the role of state and local law enforcement 
on immigration enforcement issues. Aside from the legality is the efficacy of such 
measures.   
In an ‘Issue Packet’ published by the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
(AILA), an immigrant advocacy group, are listed some general concerns about local 
enforcement of immigration issues. (These items were in response to proposed federal 
legislation of Clear Law Enforcement Criminal Alien Removal-CLEAR and the 
Homeland Security Enhancement Act—HSEA) In summary, they state that: 1) the efforts 
of immigration enforcement will undermine community based policing initiatives, 
making immigrant community members afraid to come forward to talk to the police even 
when the victim or witness to crime; 2) local law enforcement lacks experience, training 
and resources to enforce immigration law; 3) local agencies will be further drained 
financially in attempting to enforce immigration; and 4) local attempts in the past have 
failed resulting in significant monetary liability to the respective municipalities.40   
Interestingly, a publication some four years later by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) revealed very similar issues. 
While this literature was a result of input from immigrant advocates, it also was a 
partnership with the National Sheriff’s Association (NSA) and law enforcement leaders. 
The paper cited a lack of resources, language barriers, distrust of law enforcement, and 
                                                 
39. Ibid. 
40. American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), “AILA Issue Packet: CLEAR and HSEA: 
Local Law Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws,” February 2004, 4. 
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concerns about deportation or ICE actions among immigrant communities.41 It also cited 
the need for training for officers and need proactive policies. 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) in their 2009 publication, “Enforcing 
Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement” underscores the 
concerns expressed by both immigrant advocates and law enforcement. They provide a 
pro/con analysis of state and local immigration enforcement that lists impact on 
communities (pushing some away from law enforcement), draining of resources, a need 
for training and a debate over national security benefits.42 Some think immigration 
enforcement would uncover potential terrorists, while the belief of others that it would 
push immigrants underground would actually thwart that effort. 
These themes seem to resonate with law enforcement agencies and officials as 
well as advocacy groups for immigrants and foreign-born residents. On the one hand, 
protection against criminal and terrorist aliens is a sound, almost common sense idea. The 
examples of law enforcement encounters with 9/11 hijackers are chilling notions of what 
‘might have been’ had they been detained. On the other hand, stepped-up immigration 
enforcement efforts under the guise of homeland security may push affected groups 
further underground.   
Outlined in the PERF report, Sheriff Jim Pendergraph, of Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina pointed out in his efforts to enforce immigration as a 287(g) participant 
uncovered immigrants from 58 different countries arrested in Mecklenburg County. They 
found immigrants from countries that have made it known that they’re involved in 
terrorism – citing it as a national security issue.43 
David Alejandro of ICE reminded the executive law enforcement summit, in that 
same literature, of a lot of cultural differences that are misinterpreted. Many in the 
 
                                                 
41. United States Dept. of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), “Enhancing 
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foreign-born population are not really afraid of being deported. Law enforcement officers 
are corrupt in their culture, so they are feared.44  Immigration enforcement may or may 
not be the crux of the issue. 
E. POTENTIAL FURTHER RESEARCH 
One of the most telling indications in the literature of what we do not know in 
relation to state and local law enforcement’s role in immigration enforcement comes from 
the PERF report. After surveying its membership in October 2007 and holding a summit 
in December 2007 with 69 chiefs of police, sheriffs and law enforcement executives, they 
only reached consensus on three issues. They felt it was appropriate, at arrest and 
booking, to check immigration status for serious offenses; they felt a national biometric 
identification card would be helpful (based on fingerprints or DNA); and they vocally 
desired that Congress set a policy for the nation.45 
It seems that despite nearly twelve years that have elapsed since the 9/11 attacks, 
and the immigration related problems subsequently revealed to exist, we are no closer to 
providing concrete direction to state and local police agencies in immigration 
enforcement or if they should be involved at all.    
Immigration laws are complex, however so are many other laws charged to SLT 
agencies. Criminal versus civil immigrant violation status is difficult to determine. 
Numerous entities have pointed out the need for training of officers for clarity in 
enforcement. Direction and a clear strategy would be a beneficial first step. 
Future review and study could be attempted to determine fundamental items: 
 Effects of, or needs for, immigration enforcement by SLT agencies. Very 
little objective information is available regarding the effects of 
enforcement, particularly in immigrant communities. Is there a chilling 
effect making crime go under-reported.46  Most information is anecdotal. 
Baseline studies, measures of crime and security issues specifically in 
immigrant communities, willingness to support law enforcement are 
among largely unanswered questions. 
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 A common solution/Congressional direction. If the 113th Congress 
provides immigration legislation, will it provide clear strategy for 
immigration enforcement—through DHS, or state and local law 
enforcement. What do we do?  Will state and local officers should have 
clear guidelines? How will it change the discussion. 
 What would/should a national identification card entail?  The chiefs in 
their report agreed it is necessary, is it acceptable in the United States?  
What are the legal issues and challenges?  What are the logistical issues 
and challenges? 
While we often do not know what we do not know, these items could begin to aid 
in better strategy, enforcement, and security. 
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III. DIRECTED ENFORCEMENT POLICY OPTION 
[State and local law enforcement] must become engaged in immigration 
enforcement if the country is serious about achieving homeland security. 
State and local police officers are the eyes and ears on the home front. 
They know their territory. They should be enforcing immigration laws, 
just as they go after those who violate other laws.47 
A. OVERVIEW 
Some SLT law enforcement agencies across the United States have opted to take 
what this researcher terms a ‘Directed’ enforcement policy in relation to immigration 
enforcement and cooperation with Federal authorities. These agencies place an 
expectation on officers and deputies that they make immigration status queries a part of 
enforcement action at some point. While the directed enforcement may have slightly 
different approaches from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from municipality to 
municipality, each contains a directive that officers or deputies seek to determine to the 
immigration status and legal authorization status to be in the country.   
An important distinction to make at this point is the language of statutes and 
ordinances enacted at the state, local or tribal level, as well as policies and procedures 
directing law enforcement officers. Key words and phrases indicate discretion or lack of 
discretion for officers’ actions. Language in the above directives includes “shall/shall 
not,” to indicate the lack of discretion on an officer’s part—“regulations, or directives to 
express what is mandatory.”48 Terms such as “may/may not,” “can,” or other language 
indicate discretion on an officer’s part in taking some action. Linguistically, the 
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variations may seem subtle, but procedurally and legally, they make a vast difference in 
intent and direction of enforcement policy. 
In the United States, there are over 18,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement 
agencies, according the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS).49 Each 
of those agencies operates under legal authorities stemming from codes, ordinances, and 
other regulations. Many, if not most, of those agencies maintain policy and procedure 
documents or general orders for the conduct of officers or deputies on significant 
enforcement or conduct issues. Despite commonalities that may exist in the overall fabric 
of American law enforcement, the diversity of the nation is reflected in diverse police 
procedures from state to state and region to region. This applies to immigration 
enforcement policies that may exist in a given SLT agency. Agencies that maintain 
directed enforcement policies in this arena may not look the same from agency to agency. 
Therefore, this thesis looks at several examples taken from agencies and case studies in 
various parts of the United States.  
B.  DIRECTED ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES IN AGENCIES AROUND 
THE COUNTRY 
1. Prince William County Police Department 
Located about 35 miles southwest of Washington, DC, in the State of Virginia, 
the Prince William County Police Department (PWCPD) experienced an increased 
interest in the issue of immigration enforcement in 2006. Prior to that, the Police 
Department maintained a similar policy to agencies in the Washington, DC, area officers 
did not generally ask contacted individual about their immigration status.50 The Board of 
County Supervisors (BOCS) in Prince William County, however, drove efforts to change 
local government policy in regards to illegal immigrants, to include limiting or 
eliminating social services and a desire for the Police Department to become more 
involved in immigration enforcement, suggesting possible adoption of a 287(g) 
                                                 
49. United States Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Local Police,” 
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memorandum of agreement.51 The Chief at the time, Charlie Deane, drafted a new policy 
directing immigration enforcement for the Prince William County Police. The policy 
adopted in General Order 45, reads much like those found in other law enforcement 
agencies and jail settings, but it is unusual in that Prince William police are mandated to 
conduct an immigration inquiry on every person arrested and taken into custody. 
In part, General Order 45.02 directs that:52 
Officers shall investigate the citizenship or immigration status of all 
persons who are arrested for a violation of a state law or county ordinance 
when such arrest results in a physical custodial arrest being conducted. 
There may be circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment 
authorizes an earlier inquiry and officers may use their discretion in 
accordance with their experience and training to inquire as to the 
immigration status at an earlier stage. Officers must remain cognizant at 
all times of the legal justification to continue detention of a person. The 
permissible length of a lawful detention in every instance depends on all 
circumstances. 
The General Orders in both 45.01 and 45.02 outline circumstances and procedures 
in detail under which officers may or may not make an arrest in matters involving illegal 
or suspected illegal immigrants. No real distinction or difference exists when, through the 
development of probable cause, an individual is believed to have committed a crime. An 
arrest and custody would ensue, and under PWCPD’s General Orders, the arrestee’s 
status would be checked.   
However, if during the investigation while operating under reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity, the officer receives confirmation from ICE that the subject of the 
investigation is illegally present in the United States and has a felony conviction and has 
been deported—the officer may arrest without a warrant. (under Virginia code 19.2—
81.6).53 Criminal ‘hits’ or warrants in the NCIC “Immigration Violator File” (IVF) with a 
criminal detainer, as well as civil IVF hits in the course of charging and individual with 
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enumerated misdemeanor and/or traffic offenses also allow the officer to arrest and 
charge and individual with immigration offenses.54  
PWCPD officers may not arrest merely if an individual is present in the country 
illegally, with no other attendant criminal suspicion or activity. Moreover, if an NCIC 
‘hit’ is exclusively civil in nature, with no additional criminal suspicion or activity, 
officers may not arrest an individual. 
The General Orders and the PWCPD acknowledge that immigration enforcement 
is “vested in the Federal government,” but SLT law enforcement has an increasing role in 
“identifying, investigating, and apprehending persons who may be in violation of federal 
immigration law, particularly those who commit other violations of law.” However, 
policies stipulate that “the Police Department has no legal authority to independently 
enforce Federal immigration laws.” 
2. Phoenix Police Department 
Phoenix, Arizona employs a police department of over 4,000 personnel, sworn 
and non-sworn.55 In general, Phoenix is often considered “ground zero” in regards to 
immigration and immigration enforcement.56 The status of the immigration debate, 
illegal immigration enforcement and public safety are felt here dramatically.57 Phoenix’s 
efforts and policies in relation to immigration enforcement are complicated and 
overshadowed by the attention received by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and its 
Sheriff, Joe Arpaio, proclaimed “America’s Toughest Sheriff.”58 
The provision of SB 1070 left intact by the Supreme Court decision allowed the 
“shall” requirement that officers ask immigration status of offenders during a stop, 
detention or arrest.59 That provision became part of Arizona statutory law, adding the 
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new Article 8, to Title 11 of Arizona’s Revised Statutes.60 The Phoenix Police 
Department maintains a directed enforcement policy that meets statutory language and 
outlines procedural expectations for its officers. The policy requires officers question 
arrestees about citizenship.61 Further the policy allows officers to contact federal 
authorities when they encountered arrestees they suspect are in the country illegally, after 
receiving supervisory approval.62 
Found in Phoenix Police’s Operations Order 4.48, the policy has provisions and 
directives contained in it that are similar to those outlined by PWCPD. There are 
instances where officers are directed that they shall inquire about immigration stands 
and/or make contact with federal authorities to confirm a subject’s status. Other situations 
direct that an officer may ask for immigration status, based on the officer’s discretion. 
Operations Order 4.48 directs that officers shall ask all arrested persons “what 
country you are a citizen of and what is your place of birth.”63 Arrestees who are not 
United States citizens, under a waiver of the Miranda warning,64should be asked if they 
are in the country legally and if they have documentation of their lawful presence.65 
However, arrest is not the sole component that directs Phoenix Officers in immigration 
enforcement. Operations Order 4.48 makes inquiries allowable in consensual contacts or 
other interviews, but defers to the officers’ discretion, with admonishments against racial 
profiling.66Other encounters, like traffic stops or lawful detentions developed out 
reasonable suspicion officers are directed that they shall make reasonable attempts to 
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determine a subjects immigration status with federal authorities, unless circumstances 
preclude doing so (considerations for not verifying with federal authorities are described 
as time or officer safety dependent—detentions being unreasonably extended, conditions 
are unsafe, work load, and other present duties).67 In fact, the policy specifically states 
“Officers are cautioned against unnecessarily prolonging stops and detentions to 
determine a person’s immigration status.”68 
Importantly, outlined in the policy are specific items of identification which lead 
to the presumption of legal presence in the United States (driver’s licenses, government 
or tribal issued identification cards for example);  factors which may contribute to 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence (not intended to be complete or exhaustive); 
and strict admonishments against enforcement activities or investigations based on “race, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, or economic status” to avoid racial profiling and 
provide recourse if it occurs.69 
The Operations Order stresses cooperation and information sharing between the 
police department and federal authorities like ICE and Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP)—Phoenix’s nexus to the border provides a degree of contact with CBP and 
working partnerships not necessarily germane to interior immigration enforcement in 
non-border regions. Emphasis on criminal charges is evident for taking a subject into 
custody—either local criminal charges or warrants, federal criminal charges or warrants, 
or a combination.70  Contact with federal authorities is directed in custody situations. 
Strictly civil federal charges, with no attendant criminal activity generally do not result in 
arrest or transport, merely referral to federal authorities via departmental reporting and 
documentation.71  Law enforcement action is generally limited in civil matters, regardless 
of association with immigration status. The policy’s clear distinction here seeks to 
prevent being mired in complex issues that are part of overall federal immigration law, 
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much of which is purview of federal agencies alone, something the Supreme Court 
deliberated on in the decision in SB 1070. 
3.  State of Alabama 
Similar to Arizona’s SB 1070, Alabama enrolled HB 56 in 2011. Like Arizona’s 
measure, HB 56 places requirements on law enforcement officers in the state (and likely 
to inform agencies’ policies) to verify a subject’s legal status in the United States upon, 
stop, detention or arrest.72 In the first ruling since the Supreme Court’s decision on SB 
1070, the 11th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals nullified most of the measures of HB 56, 
citing that decision. However, it left in place “sections 12, 18 (and) 30” which 
respectively allow for the above action by law enforcement officers, require the carrying 
of a valid driver’s license and display of that license in a legal enforcement action, and 
the prevention of an undocumented alien from entering into a business transaction with 
state or political subdivision of a state – including obtaining a motor vehicle license.73 
The provisions of this law, as it currently stands received mixed reactions. Some 
municipalities in the state have declined to enforce it, while others actively engage in it. 
The town of Clanton has opted out of enforcement of the law, while Tuscaloosa and 
Montgomery police have enacted enforcement efforts of the law.74 Other states, like 
Georgia, are considering enrolling similar legislation. Law enforcement entities could 
easily adopt directed enforcement policies as an outgrowth of the law. 
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4. Cooperation with Federal Authorities Outside of Policies or New 
Legislation 
While some procedural efforts to enforce immigration enforcement at the SLT 
agency level are derived from and/or driven by legislation and agency policy, some 
agencies cooperate with federal immigration authorities under existing provisions of 
federal statutes and the Constitution. 
Formally, the Department of Homeland Security and ICE have four methods for 
relationships with SLT enforcement agencies. The Criminal Alien Program, Secure 
Communities, 287(g) programs in jails and task forces, and the National Fugitive 
Operations program.75 However, on December 21, 2012 Director Morton of ICE 
announced in a news release on key priorities, “ICE has also decided not to renew any of 
its agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies that operate task forces 
under the 287(g) program.”76 
In addition to formal programs such as these, ICE recognizes that “informal, 
flexible interactions where state and local law enforcement assist federal authorities in issues 
related to immigration enforcement that arise through their routine local law enforcement 
duties” are key to provision of “meaningful assistance” in immigration enforcement.77    
While the federal agreements, cooperation and memoranda of understanding for 
DHS programs listed may drive local SLT agency procedures and even inform policy, an 
exploration of those federal programs specifically is beyond the scope of this work. 
Rather, it is this researcher’s intent to examine any impacts to SLT agency enforcement 
efforts at the local level. Many SLT agencies, as will be further discussed, do not 
maintain policies specific to immigration enforcement, yet assist federal authorities 
                                                 
75. Marc R. Rosenblum, and William A. Kandel, “Interior Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal 
Aliens,” Congressional Research Service, December 2012, 13, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf. 
76. John Morton, “ICE announces year-end removal numbers, highlights focus on key priorities and 
issues new national detainer guidance to further focus resources,” 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm. 
77. Department of Homeland Security, “Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in 
Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters,” 4–5. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-
local-assistance-immigration-enforcement.pdf . 
 27
through their “routine duties” or through a level of cooperation with federal immigration 
enforcement agencies. The influence on other agency policies as well as relations in 
areas, like community policing efforts, are impacted by some of the duties executed by 
the agencies and their officers.  
a. Escondido, California—Operation Joint Effort 
An SLT agency example of a cooperative effort with federal enforcement, 
in this case ICE, is ‘Operation Joint Effort’ conducted with the Escondido, California 
Police Department (EPD), launched in May of 2010.78  The program was conceived 
based on a previous gang operation conducted in partnership with ICE. In that effort, an 
ICE officer spent time co-located with the EPD. Operation Joint Effort initially began 
with three ICE officers assigned, ultimately growing to eight officers and a supervisor.79 
The partnership formed with no written agreements or memoranda of understanding 
(MOU) between ICE and EPD; no funds are exchanged or other considerations 
provided.80 
ICE officers work very much in tandem with EPD and provide support 
and enforcement and removal resources for immigration related issues. The operation 
focuses on criminal alien apprehension and potential removal. In the first two years after 
its implementation, Operation Joint Effort touts the apprehension of approximately 800 
individuals many of whom were removed from the United States.81 
This type of cooperative arrangement procedurally impacts the EPD in 
immigration efforts. Though no written policy was developed, at least initially, it is 
reflective of enforcement efforts carried out by a local agency that seek to assist 
immigration enforcement during routine law enforcement duties and operations. Some 
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SLT agencies take part in collaborative relationships such as this in directed immigration 
enforcement, as discussed in ICE’s guidance documentation.  
C. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA-DIRECTED ENFORCEMENT OPTION 
Overall effects of directed enforcement policy or procedure options are, as with 
many enforcement policies and actions, difficult to measure – both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Laws, ordinances, regulations and other authorities cited as informing 
policy can change and/or be open to interpretation. Success or failure may not be 
indicative of applicability beyond a given municipality or jurisdiction. What proves 
acceptable and implementable in one community may not be in another without alteration 
of the policy (if it is workable at all). Nonetheless, it is important to look at the above 
directed enforcement type efforts to at least try to determine shortcomings or positive 
potential in their application. 
Ostensibly, one of the aims of a directed enforcement policy is to provide deputies 
and officers in SLT agencies guidance to take some level of enforcement action on 
subjects identified as illegal immigrants. Action taken can result in two basic levels of 
outcome (or both)—adjudication of any criminal sanctions in the SLT agency jurisdiction 
(theft, battery, robbery) and then subsequent federal immigration adjudication and 
determination for possible removal from the United States.   
Agencies and municipalities across the country routinely keep data for law 
enforcement actions, and share many of these statistics with federal authorities (i.e., data 
for inclusion in the Uniform Crime Report—UCR),82 determination of a respective 
agency’s efforts in routine enforcement are fairly simple to measure. Likewise, ICE 
maintains some level of data on criminal alien removal and enforcement programs.83  
However, because there is little if any baseline specific data on illegal immigrants in a 
given community, their links to crime, their potential as national security concerns, 
numbers that may remain after implementation of an enforcement policy or action—it is 
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difficult to measure a policies effect in a highly tangible or verifiable way. Outcomes of a 
policy are potentially interrelated to or impacted by many independent variables. An SLT 
agency’s policies or efforts in another facet of enforcement may impact immigration 
enforcement. Outside forces such as federal efforts, economic changes or political 
initiatives may also play a role in outcomes. An interim report on the Prince William 
County model from the University of Virginia, acknowledges these challenges with 
several “caveats” to a fairly extensive study.84 The caveats to the report, as well as the 
findings, albeit tentative findings, can be extrapolated and applied to similar efforts and 
situations. 
Effectiveness—Agencies utilizing directed enforcement of illegal immigration 
seem to report (where specific information and statistics are available) a level of 
effectiveness of their efforts. In California, both ICE and EPD indicate the arrest of a 
large number criminal aliens85 as part of Operation Joint Effort. ICE cites more than 800 
apprehensions in approximately two years of the operation.86 The EPD reflect significant 
numbers of apprehensions in the program as well. In less than a year, 406 of the 800+ 
arrests cited by ICE were made in Escondido; among them were those with prior criminal 
history of child molestation, gang activity and drug offenses.87  
Crime rates reported by the Phoenix police indicate significant drops in several 
areas. In 2008 property crimes dropped by 8%, while violent crimes were down 10%. 
The figures for 2009 reflected a 22% drop in property crimes and 18% decrease among 
violent crimes. While several factors contributed these statistics, Phoenix police’s 
strategies to address immigration crime, to include their revised policy are among them.88 
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The policy in Prince William County, as discussed above, was the subject of an 
extensive interim report in 2009. The findings discussed in that report are preliminary, 
coming just over a year from the policy’s adoption, and approximately two years after 
announcement of the then intended policy. Taken in total, the PWCPD arrested 63989 
illegal immigrants in the last eight months of 2008 (the period after the policy’s adoption) 
for an array of Part I and Part II offenses.90 The report indicates that effects of these 
arrests have had “small to modest” effects on most of these types of crimes and rates of 
crime. Another interesting, and perhaps important, metric of the Prince William study is 
the study of the calls for police service (not merely arrest) subsequent to the policy. 
Overall, the report indicates that after the policy’s adoption, calls for service were 
reduced by 5%—”statistically significant.”91 Rates of calls for service vary among 
different types of crime (both Part I and Part II) with some offenses dropping as much as 
9% and some approximately 2% after July 2007, when the intended policy was first 
announced.92 While it estimates the illegal immigrant community in Prince William 
County in the tens of thousands, the University of Virginia statistics do not reflect, with 
any accuracy, the number of removals of illegal aliens from the jurisdiction. Since the 
announcement and inception of the policy, it only provides an estimate of “people who 
left” at less than 5,000 but more than a few hundred.93 A little over a year later, the 
University of Virginia’s final report on Prince William County Still could only estimate 
the reduction of illegal immigrants as between one and five thousand.94 One can 
reasonably assume that some of those identified as illegal aliens arrested were removed 
from the United States and are reflected in the report’s estimate. 
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Legality—”Federal immigration law is very complicated, technical, and constantly 
changing.”95 Consequently, its understanding and enforcement is challenging for SLT 
agencies and their officers and deputies. In this researcher’s estimation, this highlights the 
need for an agency policy to guide line level efforts. The United States Supreme Court 
decision of 2012, in Arizona v. the United States, found that federal law preempted the 
additional statutes Arizona attempted to adopt. While it disallows the adoption of those 
portions of the law, it did allow what have been described as the “show me your papers” 
element of the SB 1070 and like legislation.96 The policies and procedures outlined above 
reflect efforts within the Supreme Court’s ruling. Laws, regulations, and policies which 
usurp federal supremacy on immigration matters would likely run afoul of legality for 
enforcement. Although, reasonableness of detention while investigating potential 
immigration violations (as with any suspected crime) is determinant and subject to 
challenge in the future. SLT efforts cannot extend length of detentions and a nexus to 
investigation whether a potential immigration violation or other suspected criminal 
activity. To do so would potentially violate constitutional protections. 
Acceptability—Policy enabling SLT agencies to take directed enforcement action 
at some level in immigration matters will ostensibly meet with approval of constituencies 
that favor an enforcement approach to the issue. In Prince William County, the policy 
received vocal support from the citizen’s group ‘Help Save Manassas.’97 The group, 
however, is an issue driven advocacy group that maintains its mission is to raise “public 
awareness of the negative effects of illegal aliens on our community.”98 Help Save 
Manassas, as well as the Immigration Reform Law Institute took part in crafting the 
policy in Prince William County.99 
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However, the policy outlined above for PWCPD in General Order 45.02 reflects a 
revision from a more stringent directed enforcement policy. The original version was in 
effect for approximately 8 weeks and directed that officers “shall investigate” the 
citizenship of a subject detained if probable cause existed; it did not require a custodial 
arrest. The initial policy was rescinded on April 30, 2008 in favor of the policy discussed 
above.100 The revision came after numerous and lengthy meetings of Prince William’s 
Board of Supervisors, some of which featured hours long public comment. Ultimately the 
Board adopted resolution 08–500 on April 29, 2008 to make the above change.101  While 
advocates for stricter enforcement were a part of the original policy, immigrant advocates 
and other community members helped modify the policy as originally drafted. The debate 
polarized some residents. Hispanic groups criticized the original policy as inflammatory, 
clearly limiting acceptability, at least in its original draft, in parts of the community.102 
The acceptability of SLT enforcement of immigration is likely to be intertwined 
with the perceptions of a particular agency in general. Likewise, attitudes towards the 
immigration issue at large may inform and affect opinion on directed enforcement 
adoption. Performance perceptions of police agencies reflect “underlying attitudes about 
immigration issues in the [jurisdiction] in general.”103 Pre-conceived opinions and ideals 
are then represented in perceived acceptability of a directed enforcement policy. 
Individuals and interest groups come to the discussion with biases. Nonetheless, SLT 
agencies will have to grapple with a potential ebb in trust of their actions and that of 
government entities overall – particularly among Hispanic and other minority groups.104 
Some found such policy influential enough to leave their communities altogether—
”people do not want to live in a county that is as unwelcome as PWC.”105 The attitudes 
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overall in the Prince William County experience, in some quarters, reflect the county and 
the enforcement policy. In that county (PWC) “there has been very strong persecution of 
Hispanics. They were denied main services,” according to the Hispanic Committee of 
Virginia’s Jesus Moreno.106 It would seem evident that segments of the population 
holding the same or similar opinions would find directed enforcement policy options 
difficult to accept at some level. 
The data and attitudes, however, are not necessarily indicative of a lack of trust or 
acceptance of the police agency involved in directed enforcement activities. Both the 
interim and final reports by the University of Virginia showed trends that would seem to 
belie any lack of trust of law enforcement. The data did not suggest that there was any 
under-reporting of crime by Hispanic victims in Prince William County. Rates of 
reporting were nearly identical for Hispanic and non-Hispanic victims.107 Anecdotally, it 
is frequently asserted that immigrants will avoid reporting crimes to the police, even if 
they are victims, if they believe officers or deputies could report immigration violations. 
Often any fear of law enforcement that may exist, stems not from directed enforcement or 
deportation concerns, but rather in many immigrants’ countries of origin law enforcement 
officers and agencies are corrupt.108 In the PWCPD example, satisfaction with the overall 
performance of the PWCPD, in the final report by the University of Virginia, indicated a 
“statistically insignificant” difference in satisfaction of less than three points in their 
survey.109 When specifically asked about the immigration enforcement policy, the 
satisfaction dips markedly, with just under 35% favorable opinions among Hispanics.110 
The Phoenix experience was somewhat mixed. Positive response by the 
community to the new policy was indicated. Some immigrant advocates and 
representatives felt the immigrant community benefitted from the policy because of the 
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consistency it provided for interactions with undocumented individuals.111 Others 
suggested that there was not buy-in from all officers, some of whom did not always 
comply with the policies requirements. Anecdotally, they related that there was fear 
amongst immigrants to come forward or report crime.112 
It would seem that displeasure or dissatisfaction with the police gravitates to this 
singular issue, which, as discussed above, could have attendant biases and prejudices 
from both sides of the issue. But, indications are that a clear policy, properly utilized does 
not necessarily damage overall SLT agency credibility. 
A policy implemented by an SLT agency is also scrutinized by the deputies or 
officers tasked with its implementation. At times policies of any nature may be deemed 
more or less acceptable by rank-and-file members of an agency. Law enforcement 
officers do not exist in a vacuum, they bring with them their own perspectives on the job, 
laws, policies, and enforcement activities. These perspectives certainly vary from officer 
to officer, and perhaps from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The data in Prince William 
County experience seem to suggest that the officers of the PWCPD maintained a largely 
favorable view towards the policy in that agency. Overall, the view amongst the 379 
officers who completed the survey felt comfortable administering the policy, felt the 
policy was clear, and that they had the appropriate training and skills to implement the 
policy.113 From a philosophical perspective, officers approximately two thirds agreed or 
strongly agreed with the policy, with only 11% who disagreed with it in the interim 
report.114 The basic trend remained the same in final report of 2010. Officers’ opinions 
and responses regarding the policy indicated that only 9–10% disagreed with policy and 
that 92% indicated their personal beliefs would not affect the policy’s 
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implementation.115 In the PWCPD experience, for which there is tangible data, it would 
seem that a directed enforcement approach can be an acceptable approach to immigration 
enforcement amongst SLT officers and deputies. 
Efficiency—Whether or not a directed enforcement policy adequately meets the 
objectives set forth is, like other facets, difficult to measure with precision. It is difficult 
to ascertain whether or not the expenditure of time, money, manpower and other 
resources in such enforcement achieved a worthwhile result. Measuring whether public 
safety or homeland security were improved is somewhat like trying to prove a negative. 
Apprehension and removal may thwart a criminal or terrorist enterprise; however, we 
may never know with certainty. The efficient investment of capital and enforcement 
resources can be somewhat ambiguous. 
Arrest, incarceration and potential deportation of removable aliens is one measure 
to be considered. Even the most innocuous circumstance can lead to the detention and/or 
deportation of an alien that leads to the protection of the citizenry. In the extreme, the 
example of the 9/11 hijackers is evident.   A more directed effort could have led to a 
wholly different outcome. In more commonplace examples, illegal immigrants have 
come to the attention of law enforcement authorities who, for a variety of reasons, did not 
act on their immigration status. A murder suspect, convicted in 2012, in San Francisco, 
for example, was in custody prior to the triple homicide for which he was convicted. He 
had two previous convictions as a juvenile – immigration authorities were not alerted 
because of city policy.116 
It can be asserted then, to some degree that directed enforcement efforts that 
succeed in removing deportable criminal aliens are efficient and protect the community. 
Statistically, removal rates like those discussed in EPD’s participation in Operation Joint 
Effort efficiently utilized resources to apprehend and remove hundreds of immigration 
violators. PWCPD also encountered and arrested large numbers of illegal immigrants 
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according to interim and final reports. As discussed previously, the illegal immigrant 
population diminished in the county. In Phoenix, the police department’s strategies for 
addressing immigration enforcement and crime are credited with marked decreases in the 
crime rate in both violent and property crimes.117   
Making such directed enforcement efforts and cooperation with federal 
immigration authorities, part of everyday SLT enforcement efforts can prove efficient—
particularly as officers are trained in and become more familiar with the policy and 
enforcement duties. The final report for Prince William County found that there was not a 
substantial effect on crime over all in the county, however, the policy was found to be “a 
reasonable way of targeting illegal immigrants who are serious offenders.”118 
Mere numbers of arrests and/or removals, however, do not indicate efficient 
implementation by themselves. Utilization of SLT enforcement agency assets and 
personnel for directed enforcement is inefficient if overall public safety, response to calls 
for service, and other routine duties are adversely impacted. Overall rates of satisfaction 
of police performance in the PWCPD example remained high after the directed 
enforcement policy.119 While satisfaction ratings may be a bit nebulous, they may be an 
indication that an agency and the policy are efficient in that they are not a detriment to 
handling other calls for service as well as maintaining a positive public perception. 
Implementation - SLT agency policies and procedures that pertain to any aspect of 
enforcement should be considered and tailored in light of an agency’s ability to 
realistically implement those policies. There can be numerous facets for consideration in 
directed enforcement implementation. Configuration of the agency and how it will 
implement such a policy is among them. An agency may wish to consider whether or not 
specialized units or 287(g) agreements should be a part of an overall directed 
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enforcement unit. ICE has, however, has elected not to renew agreements for field 
enforcement ‘task force’ 287(g) agreements stating other initiatives are more efficient.120  
Leadership of the organization is integral to implementing policies for directed 
enforcement. The PWCPD experience cited strong leadership that provided continuity. 
From the top down, the policy was “implemented with professionalism and that racial 
profiling would not be tolerated.”121 
Officers and deputies must be adequately trained in the policy and feel 
comfortable in their abilities to enforce it. Training involves an investment of not only 
officers’ time but in material and support as well. In implementing its policy, the PWCPD 
devoted 4,884 officer hours in training and preparation for the policy.122 This represents 
approximately 10 hours of training for each sworn officer. Such training can help officers 
to deal with immigration issues without an adverse impact on day-to-day work.123 
Educating the community about a directed enforcement policy cannot be 
neglected. As have been seen in many demonstrations and debates concerning the illegal 
immigration issue, sensitivities run high on both sides of the debate. The PWCPD 
designed a public education effort for the implementation of its policy. The efforts goal 
was two-fold; to assuage fear in the immigrant community to prevent distrust of the 
police, and to inform the public in general as to what the police could or could not do 
under the policy.124 Implementation without a component to inform the community 
would likely lead to apprehension and confusion. 
It is probably safe to assert that no SLT enforcement agency is without fiscal 
concerns. In fact, many struggle to manage the responsibilities of routine policing in the 
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face of budget cutbacks.125 The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
expressed concern that “local police leaders face a growing set of immigration related 
duties in the face of scarce and narrowing resources.”126 Implementation of a new policy 
for directed enforcement therefore must contend with costs of that implementation. Cost 
factors vary from agency to agency. Training, personnel hours, logistic support or 
booking fees are possible cost factors to consider in implementation. 
In a separate publication the IACP outlined and incentive based approach to 
immigration enforcement related issues that would help agencies defray the costs 
associated. The group asserts that agencies who “agree to perform immigration 
enforcement activities as set forth in legislation would be eligible to receive federal 
assistance funds.”127 Authorized funds could cover personnel, training, enforcement, and 
incarceration costs.128 The position by IACP was published just over three years after 
9/11. It is likely that available federal funding at the time was greater, and the national 
economic downturn was a few years off. Incentives discussed, while a boon to an SLT 
agency, may not materialize. 
Costs of implementing and maintaining enforcement will likely be borne by the 
agency, municipality or jurisdiction. Over 76% of police agencies in the United States 
have 25 or fewer officers.129 Contending with growing populations, to include 
immigrants, is a strain on resources for SLT agencies, particularly smaller ones. In the 
PWCPD experience, start-up costs were estimated at approximately $1.3 million with 
annual costs at $700–750,000.130 This sustains the training, outreach, implementation, 
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and logistics costs for an agency of over 500 sworn officers. Additionally, PWCPD 
staffed the specialized 287(g) CAU which was covered in those costs. This provides at 
least a ‘thumbnail’ sketch of potential costs—scalable to varying agency size.  
Whether or not the fiscal burden placed on an agency is tenable for 
implementation of a policy is whether it detracts from ability to continue to provide other 
enforcement activities and services. The PWCPD example suggested that the “demands 
of implementing the policy have not undermined the [agency’s] ability to control crime 
or reduced satisfaction with other police services among most PWC residents.”131 
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IV. NON-COOPERATION/SANCTUARY POLICY FOR 
ENFORCEMENT 
[I]f cops are involved in ferreting out illegal immigrants, they are likely to 
feel “caught in the middle” between public worries about illegal 
immigration and what they know works best to build trust and enhance 
overall safety.132 
A.  OVERVIEW 
In many areas across the United States, state and local governments have enacted 
and maintain policies which prohibit employees seeking or disclosing information 
regarding immigration status. These policies often referred to as ‘sanctuary’ policies, 
affect law enforcement efforts as well, preventing citizenship status from becoming 
known during local law enforcement activities.133  One estimate by the Immigration 
Policy Council (IPC) suggests: 
More than 70 cities and states across the country have adopted policies 
that prevent police agencies from asking community residents who have 
not been arrested to prove their legal immigration status.134 
However, the same report claims that the term “sanctuary” is incorrectly used to 
describe what are simply good community policing practices.135  They contend that these 
policies establish better relationships with immigrant communities and overall ability to 
fight crime. Policies in some jurisdictions, however, can effectively be construed as being 
in violation of federal provisions of the Immigration Reform Act of 1996.136  The IPC, 
interestingly, points to a quote from a publication by the IACP that:  
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Without assurances that they will not be subject to an immigration 
investigation and possible deportation, many immigrants with critical 
information would not come forward, even when heinous crimes are 
committed against them or their families137 
The IACP points out that in some regions, like the State of Colorado, sanctuary 
ordinances or laws are prohibited. Officers there must be notified in writing of their 
obligation to comply with the state law and federal authorities.138 These contentions, 
back-and-forth, place SLT agencies and their management in the middle. Immigrant 
advocacy groups tend to prefer limited cooperation and interaction with federal 
authorities like ICE. The IACP maintains that until there are comprehensive federal 
reforms, the sanctuary policies will continue to exist. Further, law enforcement 
executives must “operate within the policies established by state or local governing 
bodies, and may have to deal with these policies even though they run afoul of federal 
law and policy.”139 SLT enforcement efforts are part of the jurisdictional parameters set; 
executives and officers alike must operate within them. 
B.  SAMPLING OF AGENCIES/AUTHORITES MAINTAINING SOME 
LEVEL OF NON-COOPERATIVE OR “SANCTUARY” POLICIES 
1. Los Angeles Police Department 
The City of Los Angeles maintains the third largest police department in the 
United States, with nearly 10,000 sworn officers.140 Since November 1979, the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has operated under “Special Order 40” the subject of 
which is “Undocumented Aliens.”141 The policy set out in this succinct order directs 
personnel to contact the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (now ICE) only if 
an undocumented alien is arrested for a felony, multiple misdemeanors, or a high grade 
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misdemeanor.142  Beyond that the policy maintains that “police service will be readily 
available to persons, including the undocumented alien.”143 Notifications of status to ICE 
or other actions that are incumbent or allowed under some directed enforcement policies 
are not permitted under Special Order 40. 
Despite its longevity, Special Order 40 remains a controversial policy in the city. 
Previous Chiefs William Bratton and Charlie Beck defended the policy. Bratton affirmed 
it strongly saying that the policy is not changing “not one word” while he was chief.144 
The chief reflected that the policy has worked for nearly 30 years. According to Bratton 
though, the LAPD cooperates with ICE and maintains a good relationship with them. The 
LAPD though does not “actively participate” with ICE in sweeps or enforcement 
activity.145 
Opponents of the policy maintain that it effectively makes Los Angeles a 
sanctuary city, and opposes the rule of law. Attempts to overturn it have failed.146  Chief 
Charlie Beck affirmed that he believed in Special Order 40, both in the words and the 
spirit of the policy. Beck said the LAPD should not be “an arm of the federal government 
in enforcing immigration laws specifically.”147 
2. San Francisco Police Department 
The nearly 750,000 residents of San Francisco are served by just under 2,500 
sworn officers.148  The city and region is home to a diverse population, which is 
recognized by their law enforcement.149 The San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) 
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operates under General Order (GO) 5.15, “Enforcement of Immigration Laws.” The GO 
makes reference to San Francisco’s ordinance as a “City of Refuge,” in San Francisco 
Administrative Code.150  The GO makes it clear that in the performance of their daily 
routine duties, officers of the SFPD shall not ask about an individual’s immigration 
status. Further, officers are ordered not to enforce immigration laws or to assist (ICE) in 
the enforcement of immigration laws.151 Officers may only back up ICE agents when 
“significant danger” exists for personal safety or significant property damage. The GO 
only makes allowances for releasing information to federal immigration authorities under 
specific bookings for controlled substances, or felony bookings—if there is reasonable 
suspicion that the person booked may be in violation of immigration laws.152 The 
original order did not go as far as to stipulate the narcotics offenses. That was added 
based on a California Appellate Court ruling in October 2008 that the SFPD must “notify 
federal authorities” in the enumerated drug offenses.153 Officers in violation of GO 5.15 
are subject to discipline. 
San Francisco’s Administrative Code 12H outlines the city’s policy on 
immigration status, officially declaring the City and County of San Francisco as 
“City/County of Refuge.”154 The code encompasses virtually all city and county official 
departments and their dealings with immigrants, information, and almost complete lack 
of cooperation with federal authorities.  
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the City and County 
of San Francisco shall use any City funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of 
federal immigration law or to gather or disseminate information regarding the 
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immigration status of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco unless such 
assistance is required by federal or State statute, regulation or court decision. 
The code is the authoritative document that informs the SFPD’s GO 5.15. The 
code outlines that only when officers “become aware” of a convicted felon’s potential 
illegal immigration status are they then permitted to cooperate with federal authorities 
and/or ICE. While instructions and performance of other city departments other than law 
enforcement are outside the scope of this research, they are germane in the sense that 
there is very little differentiation between what is expected of SFPD and its officers and 
what is expected of other departments. 
3. Chicago Police Department 
While the actual policy for the police department is not available, and is in fact 
the subject of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action by the interest group “Judicial 
Watch”155 the City of Chicago has ordinances regarding citizenship and immigration 
status. Similar to a San Francisco’s definition of itself as a “City of Refuge,” Chicago has 
proclaimed itself a “Welcoming City” via Chapter 2–173 of the city’s municipal code.156 
The ordinance does not necessarily constitute policy for the Chicago Police 
Department (CPD), it likely informs that policy, much like San Francisco’s 
Administrative Code section 12H.2. In section 2–173–042, the ordinance discusses law 
enforcement in relation to immigration.157 The ordinance defines at its outset that 
immigration enforcement is primarily and federal responsibility. The “shall not” 
provisions state that no “agency or agent” shall take enforcement action solely base on 
immigration matters, for administrative warrants or civil matters nor honor civil 
immigration detainers. It precludes ICE’s access to a detained person, use of agency 
facilities, and communication with ICE regarding custody of an individual without 
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legitimate law enforcement purpose.158 Thereby, it effectively obstructs federal 
involvement unless there is “legitimate law enforcement purpose” which remains 
undefined.  
The only in instances where the code section does not apply is in the event of 
criminal warrant, felony conviction or pending, or is a validated gang member.159Absent 
those criteria, and as a “Welcoming City,” there is little if any cooperation in immigration 
enforcement. 
4. Milwaukee Police Department 
The Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) maintains an immigration policy 
outlined in 3/130.30 of their General Orders.160 One of the policies stated goals is to rid 
“the city’s streets of violent offenders regardless of whether such offenders are in the 
United States legally or illegally.” It further states that “proactive immigration 
enforcement by local police” is detrimental to the police mission and may deter some 
from participating in their “civic obligation” to assist the police.161 
On that basis, the MPD maintains that the nation’s immigration laws should be 
enforced by the federal government. The order stipulates that the MPD shall not inquire 
into the immigration status of individuals encountered during police operations or 
undertake immigration related investigations. It limits the department’s cooperation with 
federal authorities to serious situations where there is a public threat, and by request.162 
Somewhat like the SFPD, the MPD makes it a “shall not” concerning advisement 
to federal immigration officials of the “whereabouts or behavior” of potential or 
identified illegal immigrants. The only exceptions are for felony arrests, misdemeanor 
arrests involving a dangerous weapon, human/undocumented persons trafficking, 
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terrorism or subversive activity arrests, street gangs, or previously deported felons.163 
Otherwise, no notification or communication to ICE or any other federal authority is 
authorized. 
5.  Virginia Beach Police Department 
In the agency’s Operational General Order 11.10, Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, the Virginia Beach Police Department (VBPD) describes a policy remarkably 
similar to that of Milwaukee (this is not unusual as agencies often use similar sources or 
model policies like those offered by the IACP).164 Officers in the VBPD have similar 
restrictions on their interactions subjects they encounter and are admonished that they 
shall not inquire about citizenship status, and may inform federal immigration agencies 
only under the same set of arrest conviction criteria.165 
6. Cities of Talent, Oregon, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Takoma 
Park, Maryland 
Pittsburgh and Talent are separated by a great deal of geography, population, 
climate and numerous other factors. However, each municipality shares a very similar 
approach and philosophy in regards to immigration enforcement.  
Talent is a small community of about 6500 that is between the larger cities of 
Medford and Ashland, Oregon. The bucolic small town, however, adopted a fairly 
sweeping resolution in April 2003 called the “Resolution to Protect Civil Liberties,” No. 
03–642-R.166 The measure is very much a condemnation of perceived infringement on 
civil liberties from federal “anti-terrorism policies” and the USA PATRIOT Act in 
general. The resolution sees threats to civil liberties and rights from; indefinite 
incarceration of non-citizens, secret searches by federal agents, FBI surveillance 
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expansions, wire-tapping measures, and several other areas.167 The resolution issues 
directives to the police department in several different areas based on the above perceived 
grievances. The police are to “refrain from participating in the enforcement of federal 
immigration laws” indicating those are the responsibility of the federal government.168 
The resolution cites Oregon’s state law 181.850, which prohibits any SLT enforcement 
agency to use moneys, equipment, or personnel in “detecting or apprehending” subjects 
who are merely immigration violators.169 
Pittsburgh, is a city of over 300,000 in Allegheny County, and is part of a 
metropolitan area that boasts 2.3 million residents.170 The city adopted a bill in April of 
2004 remarkably similar to that of the small town of Talent, Oregon. Bill No. 2004–0295 
“Affirms its strong support” for constitutional protections and in opposition of federal 
measures that infringe on civil liberties; and for rights of immigrants opposing any 
activity that might place immigrants under scrutiny or subject to enforcement action 
based on national origin.171 
Again, like Talent, the measure provides directives to its police department. It is 
perhaps, somewhat stronger in the admonishment stating that the police should not 
participate in immigration enforcement because they are “solely the responsibility of the 
federal government.”172 Further in the document, federal policies like the USA 
PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Act, as well related executive orders, regulations 
and actions are said to, “threaten fundamental rights and liberties.” It states that SLT 
agency participation in enforcement of immigration law drives “a wedge between 
immigrant communities and the police.”173 
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In Maryland, near Washington, DC, lies the small community of Takoma Park, 
Maryland; home to about 17,000 people.174 In October 2007, the Mayor and six-member 
Council adopted Ordinance No. 2007–58 which unabashedly reaffirms the city’s status as 
a sanctuary city.175 
The ordinance is very similar in its language to those in Pittsburgh and Talent. It 
states that national security objectives and the preservation of liberty and civil rights do 
not necessarily need to conflict.176 However, its primary focus is on immigration 
enforcement and prohibiting local involvement. The prohibition extends to both civil and 
criminal immigration violations in both section A & B of City Code 9.04.010, the code 
affected by the ordinance.177 Ostensibly police officers are directed not to ask about 
citizenship and to ignore even criminal federal warrants or immigration violations they 
might encounter. Chief of Police in Takoma Park, Ronald Ricucci said 
We do not check anything to do with immigrant status. If we get an ICE 
hit, we can go no further. We cannot talk with ICE, we cannot cooperate 
with ICE. We’re going to continue to do our job; it just handcuffs us.178 
Resolutions, bills and ordinances such as these, and similar ones elsewhere, are 
expansive and touch on many areas outside immigration related issues that are outside the 
scope of this research. However, they indicate what seems to be an even stronger 
statement of refusal to engage SLT agencies in cooperation with federal authorities 
and/or in immigration enforcement.  
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C. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA—NON-COOPERATIVE OR “SANCTUARY” 
POLICIES 
Just as with directed enforcement policies, effects of non-cooperation or sanctuary 
policies or procedure options are difficult to measure—perhaps more difficult. Examining 
results of jurisdictions applying such policies is much like proving a negative. Is a ‘non-
enforcement approach’ successful?  
Anecdotally, proponents of sanctuary policies claim directed enforcement strategy 
by SLT agencies “undermines public safety,” citing numerous law enforcement officials, 
immigrant advocates, immigrants and others.179 This potential undermining of public 
safety is commonly referred to as a “chilling effect” throughout much of the literature and 
discussions, like those amongst police chiefs.180 There is, unfortunately, very little 
objective data in this regard. The Prince William County experience, and subsequent 
surveys and reports, measures components which are somewhat similar; rates of reporting 
crime. These are singular studies; however, in that they measure one particular 
jurisdictional experience after its policy implementation. 
Advocates for SLT non-cooperation in immigration enforcement assert that 
depictions of illegal immigrants as dangerous criminals, cited as a need for SLT 
enforcement, are not accurate. These claims are “mythical [and] usually based on 
rhetorical sleight of hand.”181 Directed enforcement policies are claimed to be ineffective 
on fighting crime because immigrants are less likely than native-born residents to commit 
crimes or be in jail or prison.182 The UCR data and other sources are compelling on their 
face but do not specifically address the potential chilling effect. If such a chilling effect 
exists, it might explain a low crime rate in communities with a high immigrant population 
and directed enforcement policy.  
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Crime rates have fallen during times of “dramatically” increasing size of 
immigrant populations according to FBI data cited by advocate reports.183 Conversely 
then, communities where immigrant population noticeably decreases (as has occurred in 
the PWC example) should see some indication of an increase in crime rates. In PWC it 
does not seem to have occurred, however, there is a dearth of information or studies to 
cite empirical evidence specifically related to policy—directed or non-cooperation. This 
makes evaluation measures considerably more difficult. 
Effectiveness—SLT agencies practicing directed enforcement strategies generally 
have data on which to base some measure of effectiveness; arrest rates, criminal alien 
removal, crime trends, etc. Sanctuary policy or non-cooperation jurisdictions, conversely, 
do not have data available to indicate how many enforcement actions they did not take. 
Trying to prove the negative as discussed above. Community members are not asked, and 
it is not reported in such communities (by policy) their immigration status. So it is 
difficult to determine potentially how many undocumented might be in a given sanctuary 
community or if they’ve had contact with police or any other official agency for that 
matter (health, welfare). 
There are a fairly large number of jurisdictions which have adopted some level of 
non-cooperation policy. In one estimate:  
More than 70 cities and states across the country have adopted policies 
that prevent police agencies from asking community residents who have 
not been arrested to prove their legal immigration status.184 
One can assume then, that both philosophically and/or politically these 
jurisdictions find merit in the effectiveness of such policies for their respective law 
enforcement agencies. However, it is asserted that their effectiveness is based also on 
common police practice: 
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Based on the tenets of community policing, these policies make it safe for 
immigrant crime victims and witnesses to report criminals to the police 
and help put [foreign born criminals] behind bars. Critics claim that these 
cities and states provide “sanctuary” to undocumented immigrants, but 
research shows that the opposite is true. Crime experts, including hundreds 
of local police officers, have found that cities with community policing 
policies do work closely with DHS when they have actual criminals in 
custody. Moreover, they have built important bridges to immigrant 
communities that enhance their ability to fight crime and protect all 
residents.185 
Much of the discussion and material regarding non-cooperation policy carries a 
similar message. Gaining trust, an important facet of police work to be sure, is a given in 
much of the dialog concerning sanctuary policies. San Jose, California officers are 
“ordered not to investigate someone’s immigration status even during arrests;” citing 
attempts to improve “frayed relationship[s] with immigrant communities.”186 In 
Minneapolis, Minnesota the police use the sanctuary policy to provide a basis to 
“establish trust by building relationships.”187 And in Oregon, a state with a sanctuary 
policy, the Portland Police have their own similar sanctuary policy that purportedly 
develops “trust in immigrant communities to insure public safety for all residents.”188 
The goal is fairly clear, and, on its face, not problematic—gaining trust to 
establish cooperation to make the entire community safer.189 However, from an empirical 
standpoint, trust is hard to gauge. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness 
of non-cooperation/sanctuary policies. Police officers need the community’s support and 
input, which is almost beyond question. Whether it has gained that support from these 
policies is not clear. 
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There are certainly those who contend that trust is not gained through sanctuary 
policies. Then Collier County, Florida Sheriff Don Hunter said in August 2007, that 
“trust is not inspired in the idea that certain crimes will not be enforced by law 
enforcement.”190 Sheriff Hunter found the idea of idea of the “chilling effect” intuitively 
appealing but added: 
Those who allege the effect carry the burden that such an effect exists. 
How would we go about proving the negative, that crime will not be 
reported if the law is enforced?  We are unlikely to prove that a specific 
crime will not be reported if we enforce immigration law just as we cannot 
demonstrate that we prevented a specific crime in our most recent patrol 
tour.191 
Sheriff Hunter relates that crime statistics for 2005 would indicate that in general 
about 58% of all crime was not reported according to the UCR. Most jurisdictions that 
promote non-cooperation/sanctuary policies had them in that year. Based on assumptions 
under these statistics, Hunter contends that though all crime victims are a priority, we 
“lose very little by the theoretical chilling of crime reporting” by undocumented 
immigrants. They (the undocumented) are, by extrapolation a “small fraction” of victims 
of unreported crime – stressing the building of trust through predictable enforcement.192 
Legality—The question of the legality of non-cooperation/sanctuary policies 
centers primarily around two pieces of federal legislation from 1996; the “Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act”193 and the “Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.”194 The acts established public 
laws, respectively, 8 USC § 1373 and 8 USC § 1644. These codes are fairly similar in 
that they make it unlawful to restrict the provision of information regarding immigration 
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status from state or local government entities, or their employees, to federal immigration 
authorities.195  §1644 states:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no 
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way 
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.196 
USC § 1373 adds provisions that make it unlawful to disallow maintaining 
information about immigration status or exchanging that information with federal 
authorities or state or local government agencies. Further, it mandates that federal 
immigration authorities will respond to lawful inquiries by SLT agencies about 
immigration status.197 
The acts and subsequent laws are clearly an attempt to establish a reciprocal 
exchange of information between federal authorities and SLT agencies and governments. 
Interference with such an information exchange is, by these measures, unlawful. But 
what if the information is not captured and ostensibly does not exist at the SLT level?  
That is very much at the core of sanctuary policies. Sanctuary/non-cooperation advocates 
point out, “the laws did not address policies that prohibit state and local officials from 
acquiring that information in the first place, and they did not affirmatively require 
agencies to ask the immigration status” of offenders.198 
Many sanctuary and non-cooperation policies, like some of those outlined above 
are principally directives not to gather immigration information. Generally when it is 
allowed, it is only under limited conditions like felony arrests, arrests involving a deadly 
weapon, human trafficking or other stipulations.199Routine enforcement and a myriad of 
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other government activities are directed not to expend resources to gain immigration 
status information. If it is not gathered, it cannot be shared.   
Still other non-cooperation efforts, like California’s effort, originally called the 
TRUST act (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools), do not address 
information sharing per se, but attempt to limit the scope cooperation will take.200 The 
measure sets parameters for California’s law enforcement agencies to cooperate with the 
Secure Communities program. Only current or previous convictions for felonies and 
certain enumerated crime categories would allow an agency to honor a federal 
immigration detainer as part of Secure Communities.201 ICE itself describes the detainers 
as a notice that it intends to take custody of an individual, however, it is a “request” that 
an agency retain custody until it does so.202 So it remains murky whether placing 
limitations for honoring detainers faces legal challenge. Releasing the subject of a 
detainer would seem to place the liability for doing so on an SLT agency or the state or 
jurisdiction applying such a regulation. 
Acceptability—Interestingly there, at least in terms of the designation of 
“sanctuary” some disagreement even among those who would advocate for little or no 
involvement of SLT agencies in immigration enforcement. San Francisco highlights its 
sanctuary, or “City of Refuge” status, as being in opposition to “repressive immigration 
proposals in Congress.”203 The city also publishes a brochure highlighting itself as a 
sanctuary city.204 The brochure assures readers that employees “may not” help ICE.205 
Other jurisdictions discussed above, also embrace the ideals of sanctuary and proudly use 
the term. 
                                                 
200. Amiano, “AB 1081.” 
201. Ibid. 
202. Department of Homeland Security ICE, “Detainters: Frequently Asked Questions,” 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm. 
203. City of San Francisco, “Sanctuary Ordinance,” http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1067. 




However, others distance themselves from the term, saying it is inaccurate. The 
policies dubbed ‘sanctuary’ are really just sound community policing strategies.206 It is 
asserted that no sanctuary is given under these community policing strategies, and that 
the real sanctuary is found in jurisdictions in which SLT agencies actively participate in 
immigration enforcement.207 This could be explained away as a purely semantic 
discussion about what sanctuary means, however, the acceptability of the designation 
seems in question, even from those who advocate for non-cooperation policies. 
Local policies concerning immigration enforcement are a matter for local 
decision, according to the IACP.208 According to that tenet, their acceptability for law 
enforcement officials and officers would be driven by local directives. While personal 
philosophies may vary amongst individual, it would not be an unacceptable position 
overall according to the IACP. Others assert that SLT agencies “around the country 
support [these] policies” because they encourage immigrant support of the police and the 
maintenance of a positive relationship with immigrant communities.209 
Immigrants’ rights and other advocacy groups, not surprisingly, espouse and 
support non-cooperation enforcement policies. Groups like the National Council of La 
Raza (NCLR) discuss the policies as “critically important” protections of immigrants, 
enhancing police efforts and the willingness of immigrants to cooperate with them.210 
This opinion of sanctuary policies is shared by other prominent groups like the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), National Immigration Law Center (NILC), 
and others, who publish similar opinions and work to proliferate those views. 
Citizens’ views on non-cooperation or sanctuary policies vary. Despite some 
communities, regions or even states, espousing clear policies limiting or forbidding SLT 
agencies’ cooperation with federal authorities, individual citizens, advocacy groups, and 
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others may suffer under laws, ordinances and policies with which they may not agree. In 
San Francisco, the case that amended the SFPD’s policy, requiring enforcement of 
immigration in specified drug offenses, was filed with a private citizen as the plaintiff.211 
This is likely reflective of divergent opinions as to what is acceptable for SLT agencies 
and policies on immigration enforcement. 
Also expressive of divergent thought on SLT agencies and jurisdictions adoption 
of non-cooperation/sanctuary policies, are efforts to exact a fiscal price for them from 
federal legislators. A 2012 measure attached to a spending bill in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, sought to deny funds to “sanctuary cities and any communities that fail 
to enforce immigration laws.”212 The measure’s sponsor, Representative Joe Walsh said: 
If cities and states refuse to enforce the immigration laws that are on the 
books, they will no longer receive taxpayer funds to do so. 
Clearly there is an undercurrent, even at the national level, that finds a lack of 
cooperation with federal authorities in immigration enforcement as unacceptable – even 
if the measure is unsuccessful. Others seem to think that no city “refuses to enforce 
immigration law”213indicating that sanctuary policies are acceptable in that they do not 
preclude enforcement activities. 
Efficiency—A jurisdiction and SLT agencies maintaining non-
cooperation/sanctuary policies would not seem to undermine efficiency, at least 
internally. Enforcement efforts directed to not ask about immigration status except, 
perhaps, under limited situations, would free officers and deputies to focus on efforts 
deemed more appropriate to their roles and the objectives of their agencies. Non-
enforcement or limited enforcement is efficient from a logistical standpoint (dismissing 
valuation judgments of the policy)—resources are available elsewhere. Resources and 
funds could become less available if efforts to withhold funding were put in place. 
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More broadly, however, it is difficult to discern whether or not non-
cooperation/sanctuary policies are efficient to the law enforcement mission and the 
homeland security mission. If, as has been asserted, SLT law enforcement represents a 
significant force multiplier in homeland security efforts, then perhaps ignoring all but the 
most serious and egregious immigration violations is counterproductive and inefficient. 
Clearly there are “hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers” patrolling every 
community every day.214 There are nearly 800,000 officers in approximately 18,000 SLT 
agencies.215  It would seem that a level of vigilance and observation is impossible to 
achieve outside the enlistment of those assets, for homeland security concerns, to include 
immigration enforcement. It may be far less efficient to try to implement meaningful 
enforcement with the 20,000 or so that ICE employs – who are spread out amongst 
detention, deportation, investigations, enforcement, etc., across the country.216 The level 
of efficiency of policies of non-cooperation or sanctuary varies depending upon what is 
specifically being measured. It would seem inefficient nationally and perhaps as a 
homeland security effort, not to utilize at some level, the enforcement assets that exist in 
SLT agencies nationwide. 
Implementation—As previously discussed, SLT agencies’ ability to implement a 
given enforcement policy should be a consideration in its formulation. Non-
cooperation/sanctuary policies more closely resemble acts of omission than affirmative 
procedures. SLT officers and deputies are instruct not to collect information, not to 
consider immigration status, etc., except, perhaps, under very specific situations. It is, 
therefore, difficult to assess implementation. Much like proving a negative, determining 
successful implementation criteria of a policy for something officers and deputies would 
not do is problematic. 
Implementing procedural limitations or denying officers’ and deputies’ ability to 
gain immigration information will likely be shown as an impact in other areas. In the 
extreme, from a homeland security standpoint, lack of information about immigration 
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status could lead to oversight as discussed in 9/11 Commission’s report about the plots 
hijackers. Many of them had contact with officers during low-level enforcement actions 
(usually vehicle stops), while immigration violators at some level.   Other serious 
offenders, with immigration status violations, could similarly be contacted during routine 
law enforcement duties - human traffickers, drug runners, members of violent gangs. 
Implementing non-cooperation policies must take into account at some level the potential 
missed opportunities for law enforcement action.   
Law enforcement has been impacted itself by deportable aliens being released 
from custody, with no check or verification of immigration status. The Scottsdale 
Arizona Police Department lost Officer Nick Erfle in 2006 in a shooting with Erik Jovani 
Martinez—a deportable alien the agency had in custody approximately four months 
earlier.217 The agency had no policy of directed enforcement or cooperation with federal 
immigration authorities, and no attempt to remove Martinez was made. Scottsdale 
implemented a policy of checking immigration status of arrestees after the shooting.  
In any case, it is possible, even likely, that with illegal immigrants in the United 
States exceeding 11 million, those who have criminal tendencies or intent would commit 
crimes before SLT agencies were ever aware of their presence. Some point to examples 
like the shooting of Officer Erfle as tragic, but somewhat anecdotal. Even with the 
strictest enforcement, “career criminals” would get through.218 In Erfle’s case, it is 
discussed that he died because his killer, Martinez, was a violent criminal, not because he 
was an illegal alien.219 The underlying logic being that stricter enforcement is not 
necessarily a remedy and non-cooperation policies are not to blame. 
SLT agencies and officers have documented and regulated criteria for taking 
enforcement action. Investigating, developing probable cause, receipt of an arrest 
warrant, discovery of evidence, etc., these are all “tools in an officer’s toolbox.” Non-
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cooperation and sanctuary policies allow the “tool” of immigration violations to be used 
only in rare instances, if at all. They maintain the implementation of these policies 
protects and values their respective agencies relationships with immigrant communities 
and community policing efforts over strict enforcement. It is likely they would be cost-
neural fiscally, but impacts could be felt in other ways. 
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V. COLLABORATIVE/CONSENSUS POLICY FOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
It is imperative that more information be gathered about the nature of 
challenges facing local police in immigration issues so that the police and 
community can work together more effectively.  
–Dr. Paul Lewis220 
A. OVERVIEW 
Policy seeking to find consensus or collaborative strategy is, at best, difficult to 
find. SLT agencies with immigration policies generally adopted either some level of 
directed enforcement or a non-cooperative policy. According to a 2008 study by Arizona 
State University of 237 law enforcement executives, twenty percent describe their 
government and agency has a “don’t ask/don’t tell or sanctuary” policy, while twenty 
nine percent indicate a directed enforcement policy that takes some level of cooperation 
or proactive role.221 The same study said that fifty-one percent of the executives surveyed 
have no policy, written or unwritten, regarding officers’ dealings with immigrants.222 
SLT agency heads have received little guidance at any level. The issue is very 
controversial, which often leads to the lack of policy in most agencies.223 
So policy seems to be an either-or proposition. SLT agencies and their respective 
jurisdictions who have not adopted a proactive or non-cooperative strategy, have adopted 
no policy at all. An example of an agency that did attempt to reach a policy based on the 
consensus of interested parties, through a collaborative process is Mesa, Arizona. In 
January of 2009, then Police Chief, George Gascón published Special Order 2009–01, a 
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protocol for immigration enforcement in Mesa.224 The special order was changed slightly 
as an outgrowth of Arizona’ SB 1070 requirements, by subsequent Chief, Frank Milstead, 
in FLD 441.225 The effort for arriving at Special Order 2009–01 was unique in light of 
the usual dichotomy on the issue in general. 
B. COLLABORATIVE-CONSENSUS APPROACH 
1. Mesa Police Department 
The city of Mesa has a population of approximately 478,000. Maricopa County, 
in which Mesa is located, has a population of just under 4 million – of whom it is 
estimated, nine percent is undocumented (around 360,000 people).226 Mesa’s Police 
Department (MPD) consists of approximately 800 sworn officers, sharing jurisdiction 
with the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO). In the past, the MPD had been 
criticized by some for lack of immigration enforcement.227 
In 2006, George Gascón was appointed Chief of Police of Mesa. The immigration 
issue then, as now, was contentious. Some felt the city and MPD maintained what 
amounted to sanctuary policies. Among immigrant communities, there was generally a 
feeling of “suspicion and mistrust.”228 Gascón had to balance both sides of the issue—
those who sought stricter enforcement of immigration laws and the risk of damaging trust 
with the immigrant population, particularly those who were victims and/or witnesses to 
crime.229 
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In order to balance the desire for stricter enforcement and the fear of 
disenfranchising immigrant communities, Gascón sought to apply factual information in 
the discussion. To that end, each of the city’s five district police stations held community 
forums and established advisory groups to identify priorities and establish better 
communications.230 The effort was lauded by one of the forums, the Hispanic Advisory 
Forum, as the promotion of “transparency in police operations and decision-making.”231 
Gascón sought input from diverse groups in relation to the protocol. In addition to 
the advisory groups, he approached other community groups, city officials, city 
attorney’s office, police unions and police focus groups.232 The entire process took place 
over the course of nearly a year, and was ultimately completed in late 2008. Training in 
the policy was provided by MPD officials to not only officers, but advisory groups, the 
news media and others. References and resources were provided for officers in the field 
for quick review for situations on the street. Significant effort was made for both input for 
the policy and understanding by the community.233 
The resulting protocol instructed that adults arrested (and juveniles with certain 
felony charges) shall be asked about immigration status. Immigration violations shall be 
documented in a report and ICE shall be contacted. Those contacted for lesser citable 
offenses may be asked. Those not to be asked are, victims, witnesses, juveniles (other 
than above), traffic violators, those seeking medical care, and those involved in volunteer 
activities like neighborhood watch or citizen’s academies.234 
City officials, to include the Mayor, Scott Smith, recognized that it was important 
the result be considered “city policy” and not solely a responsibility of the MPD. To that 
effect, it was enacted by the city, not merely adopted as internal policy.235 Smith 
indicated that Mesa was trying to strike a balance between immigration enforcement and 
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providing safety and police services for all of the city’s residents. He admitted, however, 
that this was “an intensely political issue, we have to recognize we can’t change 
everyone’s mind on the issue.”236 
Special Order 2009–01 attempts to straddle the issue to a degree. It does not 
forbid officers from consideration of immigration status of individuals with whom they 
come in contact. The order allowed assessment for individuals arrested, and prescribed 
actions for those deemed to be immigration violators. It makes clear distinction between 
civil and criminal status offenses, and prevented officers from concerning themselves 
with immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, and juveniles (unless serious 
offenders).237 As discussed previously, Special Order 2009–01 was superseded by MPD 
policy FLD 441. However, the most of the principles of the special order were kept 
intact, changing only the preclusion of asking immigration status of crime victims, 
witnesses and juveniles.238 In light of this change, driven by SB 1070 requirements, 
Chief Milstead met with many of the same community groups consulted in adoption of 
Special Order 2009–01. His efforts were aimed at reassuring all members of the 
community of the MPD’s focus on safety and well-being of those in Mesa.239 
Special Order 2009–01 reflected an effort to address concerns from all sides of 
the issue. It sought to join immigration enforcement efforts by MPD’s officers, with 
protections for community policing efforts and relationships with the entire community, 
to include the immigrant community. Much of Special Order 2009–01 appears somewhat 
similar to other enforcement efforts. However, in its development, preparation and 
implementation, it was different than many other efforts. 
While outreach to community groups in relation to police activities and policies is 
not entirely new, efforts of that type typically take place after a policy’s adoption. SLT 
agencies generally find themselves explaining and educating the public about their 
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enforcement activities and existing policies. Mesa, instead, spent a year working with 
many divergent groups to come up with the policy. Individual citizen forums, city 
leaders, legal experts, the media and police officer groups all had a part in formulating 
the protocol, rather than simply hearing about it post-implementation. 
Beyond that, however, there was a concerted effort to train not only officers in the 
protocol, but the same interest groups were included as well. The efforts at training and 
educating are ongoing. The  MPD is involved in continuous outreach to what is often a 
very transient population.240 Chief Gascón and the MPD sought transparency in the 
protocol and all facets of its implementation. Now District Attorney of San Francisco, 
Gascón still describes the efforts in Mesa as working “side by side with community 
groups and civil rights organizations to foster a sense of trust between the Latino 
community and Mesa Police.”241 
It is as much in the way the MPD reached its protocol in Special Order 2009–01 
and the efforts surrounding it, as the policy itself that set it apart from other policies 
discussed. It is one of the few that have sought to build consensus through ongoing 
collaboration of interested groups. 
C. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA—COLLABORATIVE-CONSENSUS POLICY 
APPROACH 
As with both directed enforcement efforts as well as non-cooperative policies, 
evaluating a collaborative policy’s effectiveness, like that in Mesa, is somewhat difficult. 
Objective data is not readily available to assess some of the criteria. There are not 
targeted studies following the implementation, and performance data (arrests, crime rates, 
trends, etc) may not specifically reflect policy measures exclusively.   
Additionally, there are very few efforts at SLT immigration policy that reflect a 
consensus approach. As the Arizona State University research discusses, policies tend to 
reflect either a directed enforcement philosophy or a non-cooperative one. Examining 
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collaborative policy efforts then in the SLT immigration arena specifically does not 
provide a wealth of resources. However, in examining both the policy that exists as well 
as processes to arrive at similar policy, it is possible to glean salient information. 
Effectiveness—One of the outgrowths of taking a collaborative approach in policy 
development is the residual benefit of leveraging relationships forged in that process. 
Day-to-day enforcement efforts related to policy (or perhaps even unrelated) are 
enhanced by similar levels of cooperation and integrative thought. MPD employed 
Special Order 2009–01 in immigration relation enforcement, using similar collaborative 
efforts in an issue the city faced in day labor hiring sites. Using “Community Action 
Teams” MPD tried to maintain good relations with the immigrant community while still 
addressing the hiring sites and the quality of life issues they sparked.242 In fact, the MPD 
approached this problem, not as an immigration enforcement issue, but rather as a general 
enforcement/trespassing concern.  
The MPD and the teams used similar strategies of education and information to 
constituent groups—contractors, day laborers, businesses and others. Signs, flyers, 
meetings and working through community groups helped inform all that hiring sites 
would be subject to trespassing enforcement.243 While not immediate, the behavior was 
ultimately changed with cooperation from laborers and those looking to hire. Business in 
general at hiring sites became more conducive to customers. One officer cited the 
approach and success as meeting the challenge “to make a difference in a long-standing 
problem” not just making arrests.244 
Enforcement activities, tangential to the policy itself were effective, largely on the 
basis collaborative efforts forged as part of the Special Order. One of the goals of the 
MPD’s policy specifically was a focus on the mission of public safety, not exclusively 
immigration enforcement.245 Items like the enforcement at day labor hiring sites 
effectively translated the immigration protocol into such enforcement activities. 
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Legality—Mesa’s effort was clearly an attempt to engage the community in the 
policy and find a consensus of opinion in protocol and ultimately in enforcement. There 
is a need for an agency policy to guide line level efforts and not to forego any policy in 
hopes that SLT deputies and officers will somehow make the appropriate enforcement 
decisions. Having both the support and input of constituent groups, as well as city legal 
counsel, in a formal policy, there is far greater likelihood that such procedures will 
maintain appropriate legal standing. 
MPD’s protocol and even FLD 441 allow for investigations of immigration status; 
although, reasonableness of detention while investigating potential immigration 
violations (as with any suspected crime) is determinant and subject to challenge in the 
future. The new approach under FLD 441 extends to victims, witnesses and juveniles the 
authority of officers to investigate immigration status. It is likely that this permission 
would not preclude probable cause and other legal authority to be in contact with these 
individuals. Random encounters to merely check immigration status could certainly strain 
the legality and propriety of enforcement and would risk issues of racial profiling. 
Acceptability—On its face, an approach that emanates from a collaborative effort 
on the part of law enforcement executives, community members, city officials and other 
integral participants—who will be subject to a policy—will make it more readily 
accepted by those same constituencies. 
Enforcement efforts by SLT agencies in virtually any endeavor impact 
communities and the people in them. Immigration enforcement is a particularly charged 
issue, with opinions and passions about SLT agency involvement from citizens, interest 
and advocacy groups, politicians, media and others representing all sides of the issue. 
Collaborative efforts and policy that demonstrate a consensus approach can help involve 
the parties in compromise and cooperation. MPD’s efforts in Special Order 2009–01 






individually and as a group” to create “multiple benefits” for many groups to enjoy.246 
Consensus around a policy, or other course of action, will likely lend to its acceptability.  
In Mesa, community leaders involved in the policy’s drafting felt the policy made 
things clearer. Latino Community Services Director, Magdalena Schwartz said the policy 
was “not too bad,” adding that this would help the Latino community “to know the laws 
and be able to follow the laws as well as know their rights, by clarifying all of this, it will 
help [the Latino community] make the right choices.”247 Phil Austin, former president of 
the Mesa Association of Hispanic Citizens, indicated it was good for Mesa to have a 
clear-cut policy.248 
Prior to the MDP policy revision, critics labeled Mesa a sanctuary city – too lax 
on illegal immigrants. The policy’s clarification and direction likely gains the buy-in of 
those groups as well. The police union and membership indicated the policy increases 
time officers spend on the checks, but added though it “may add to the workload, but it is 
for a good cause.”249  Collaboration lent to acceptability. 
Efficiency –A policy built around consensus that seeks a level of collaboration and 
compromise that will, hopefully, increase overall understanding and acceptability for a 
level of efficiency. MPD’s policy did not represent a “radical change” according to police 
personnel and unions, but it would, however, impact officers’ time to run status checks in 
street level enforcement.250 Bryan Soller, president of the Fraternal Order of Police, 
indicated that the immigration enforcement efforts would be part of regular enforcement 
activities, not targeted on pursuing immigrants: 
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We don’t see this as a huge amount of loss of time. We’ll still make stops 
only for legal reasons and if we come across someone who may be illegal 
during that process, we’ll do a more in-depth interview.251 
Admittedly then, in this collaborative example, there is an impact on efficiency to 
the organization, albeit a small one. However, as community leaders have indicated in 
Mesa, it makes it clearer for community members. They have “the power of knowledge” 
according to Austin which could lend to making the police and interactions with them 
involve less trepidation.252 Having knowledge, understanding enforcement priorities will 
likely lead to less fear of reporting, more police action in necessary, criminal situations 
and an increase in overall efficiency. “Mesa will continue its practice of encouraging 
crime victims or suspects, regardless of their immigration status, to contact them.”253 
There is an investment of resources and time in protocols such as this. It is 
important to focus on proper due process and criminal enforcement and community 
safety. Merely rounding up deportable aliens should not be the goal in SLT agency 
involvement. As Chief Gascón points out:  
It’s important to recognize that sometimes the most expeditious way of 
handling things is not necessarily the best thing. We don’t want to deport 
someone without prosecuting someone here for local crimes if that doesn’t 
make sense at the time.254 
Collaborative efforts like MPD’s do not guarantee greater efficiency, however, 
having contributors from amongst the community and effected groups will bring 
expertise and perspective to help. The goal is to “give something up and getting 
something back that is even better.”255 
Implementation –Implementing a policy driven by a degree of collaboration and 
consensus can account for its impact. It is possible that any change in operational goals 
and objectives can affect manpower, time and ultimately budgetary issues.   
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A measured approach to implementation a new policy will require education and 
training in addition to the impacts of the policy itself. MPD spent four months providing 
training to its sworn officers.256 It also provided training to volunteers, community 
members, the media, and other affected parties.257 Procedures, attendant forms, 
incarceration issues all factor into implementation. 
Proper implementation takes into account and prioritizes such issues. However, 
collaborative policy, or any policy, should be a living and adjustable guideline, nimble 
enough to adjust for need, changes or problems in implementation. Mayor Scott Smith, in 
Mesa as well as the Chief noted that their policy was not perfect, but that it would 
“evolve over time.”258 Flexibility and recognition that some aspects will need to be 
revisited war an important facet of implementation. It is an ongoing effort to draft 
reasonable policies and protocol in the SLT enforcement environment, not a one-and-
done proposition. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
What is missing is a sensible national policy with a standardized approach 
regarding immigration, including defined sanctions for illegal immigrants 
who commit various crimes. Without such a policy, we spin our wheels 
and end up in the middle of a political debate that seems to generate hate 
and fear. This is not productive, because most local departments continue 
to believe that building trust and communication with all of our 
communities, especially our minority communities, is a key component of 
effective and enlightened policing.  
–Chief Kim Dine, Frederick, MD259 
A. OVERVIEW 
The 113th United States Congress wrestles with immigration reform through 
legislation for which there is ongoing debate, even as of this writing. Whether it will 
achieve what Chief Dine speaks about, in a “thoughtful policy, by which police 
departments can operate,” is unclear. Labor groups, like that representing ICE officers, 
the National ICE Council, along with other law enforcement officials as signatories, have 
released statements indicating their views about problems with the debated legislation: 
The legislation before us may have many satisfactory components for 
powerful lobbying groups and other special interests, but on the subjects 
of public safety, border security, and interior enforcement, this legislation 
fails. It is a dramatic step in the wrong direction.”260 
Others maintain a view counter to that, as with virtually all discussions or efforts. 
The United States Chamber of Commerce issued a letter on the issue indicating its 
support for the legislation and its provisions for economic and security improvements.261 
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On its website, the National Immigration Law Center welcomes the legislation as a 
“positive first step in moving toward a commonsense immigration system.”262 
No matter the outcome of current legislation, and what form it ultimately takes, 
SLT enforcement agencies must still address the issue of local policy in enforcement. 
State and local entities cannot encroach on federal purview and the Supremacy Clause—
the issue much at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona et al. v. United 
States. The same decision did allow for law and policy decisions directing enforcement of 
existing immigration laws. Likewise, federal authorities cannot mandate and effectively 
conscript enforcement actions of SLT agencies. Addressing the issue is, a will very likely 
continue to be, a local issue. It is somewhat troubling then that very few SLT agencies 
have established policies and procedures concerning immigration enforcement. It is even 
more troubling that existing policies on an obviously contentious issue rarely reflect 
approaches that are inclusive of interested parties in collaborative efforts. 
B. OPTIONS MATRICES 
Policy options regarding SLT agency enforcement in the immigration arena are 
largely qualitative and would likely vary amongst agencies, depending on size, fiscal 
constraints, training, and other determinant factors like resources, support from the 
federal government and other factors. Nonetheless, in examining policy options, an 
attempt to quantify options in an outcomes matrix can aid in efforts to objectively review 
those policies.   
For the purposes of this research, the following outcome values were applied in 
consideration to research and available data: 
 Effectiveness 1–5 (1= few or no contacts/enforcement with deportable 
immigration violators, 5=high number of contacts/enforcement actions) 
 Legality 1–5 (1= conflict/potential conflict with 
laws/ordinances/decisions, 5 = little or no conflict in those areas) 
 Acceptability (1= constituencies/citizens/interest groups balk at given 
policy, 5 = endorsement by same concerned groups)  
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 Efficiency 1–5 (1= Enforcement  nets offenders but burdens SLT agencies 
with more duties and tasks for finite resources, 5 = Enforcement  nets 
offenders, while minimizing new burdens on resources) 
 Implementation 1–5 (1= SLT agencies bear a significant burden in 
implementing and using an option, 5 = SLT agencies can absorb the 
enforcement option with little or no impact) 
1. Directed Enforcement—3.2/5 
 
Directed Enforcement Policy Options Matrix 
Effectiveness 4 Legality 3 Acceptability 2 Efficiency 4 Implementation 3 
Net arrests are 
reported as significant 
in areas employed 
with drop in crime 
rates. Effectiveness 






legal with SLT 
agencies. Subject to 
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restrictions, 
probable cause, etc. 


















and to fiscal 
responsibilities 
Table 1.   Directed Enforcement 
Directed enforcement efforts achieve some level of result in identifying 
immigration violators and communicating with and/or working with ICE to determine 
priorities for immigration detention and adjudication. Broad application of directed 
enforcement policies could, in fact, strain ICE’s ability to detain and process immigration 
violations, despite prioritization. 
Directed enforcement efforts are allowable, from a legal perspective, but 
immigration laws are admittedly complex. Understanding and applying directed 
immigration policies requires training, understanding and communication with federal 
authorities, regardless of how a given agency attempts to pursue enforcement policies. 
Conducting directed enforcement is a “dicey” proposition in terms of community 
reaction. Immigrants groups could develop what is described as the ‘chilling effect’ and 
retreat from cooperation and interaction with law enforcement for fear of being handed 
over for deportation. Others in favor of “enforcement first” efforts, on the other hand, 
generally laud efforts by SLT agencies in immigration enforcement. 
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Directed enforcement efforts judiciously applied, can net offenders during routine 
law enforcement activities. The ubiquitous nature of SLT law enforcement, not 
surprisingly, will lead to encounters with individuals during responses to calls for service, 
traffic enforcement, contact with subjects, proactive enforcement, and other duties.  
It requires a significant amount of training, resources, enforcement time, detention 
space and pursuit of adjudication to implement directed enforcement efforts. Agencies 
commit to making this component a part of everyday activities; expending resources to 
do so. 
2.  Non-cooperative/Sanctuary—2.8/5 
 
Non-cooperative/Sanctuary Policy - Options Matrix 
Effectiveness 2 Legality 2 Acceptability 2 Efficiency 3 Implementation 5 
Effectiveness of 
directing SLT officers 
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Table 2.   Sanctuary Enforcement 
Non-cooperative/Sanctuary enforcement efforts can be argued, in a fashion, to be 
effective in that they succeed in not identifying potential immigration violators—
questions that are rarely if ever asked. Ostensibly, cooperation amongst immigrant 
communities would be higher, lacking a ‘chilling effect;’ however, evidence here remains 
anecdotal, not empirically linked to such efforts. 
Applicable federal codes make it a violation not to provide information regarding 
a subject’s immigration status to ICE or other relevant authorities. Non-
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cooperative/Sanctuary policies rely on never gaining that information in the first place; 
forbidding authorities from asking. Other SLT jurisdictions openly flaunt efforts under 
the Patriot Act and seemingly provide some level of protection and local ‘citizenship’ as 
“Cities of Refuge,” and “Sanctuary Cities.”   
Like directed enforcement efforts, sanctuary-type policies are lauded by some 
segments of a community and assuaged by others. Citizens, advocacy groups, politicians 
have staked out their respective territories on the issue. Cast against the proposition that 
non-cooperative policies could shield serious criminal violators, acceptability of 
sanctuary style policies, especially in hindsight, can prove less acceptable. 
The non-cooperative policies are effective in that they do not require SLT officers 
and deputies to do anything – quite the contrary, they are asked not to do things, or ask 
questions about legal status in the U.S. However, there is question about the effectiveness 
of such policies in both criminal and immigration arenas. Human trafficking, violent 
criminal gangs, and drug-smuggling activities often have a nexus to undocumented status 
and illegal presence in the country. Not ascertaining any of this information could lead to 
stymieing of related enforcement efforts. 
Non-cooperative/Sanctuary measures are relatively easy to implement and do not 
drain resources or enforcement time, training, etc. SLT officers and deputies working 
under non-cooperative policies simply do not make such inquiries a part of how they 








3. Collaborative/Consensus Policy—4/5 
 
Collaborative/Consensus Policy - Options Matrix 
Effectiveness 4 Legality 5 Acceptability 4 Efficiency 4 Implementation 3 
Immigration related 
cases are not the 
primary focus, but 
an outgrowth. 
Strategies focusing 















contact for other 
issues/crimes.  
Input gained and 
maintained from 





Most actions take 
place within the 
context of current 
law enforcement 













may be needed 
Table 3.   Collaborative Enforcement 
Policies built around consensus, through collaboration with concerned segments 
of the community, potentially maintain a high degree of effectiveness. In general, 
immigration enforcement is not a focus, but rather an outgrowth of, routine law 
enforcement activity. Inquiries into legal status in the country are not disallowed by 
policy, nor is relating that information to federal authorities. Focus on criminal activity 
and maintaining public safety is primary to immigration enforcement.   
Collaborative efforts likely do not run afoul of requirement to communicate 
immigration status in cooperation with federal authorities. They can also be tailored to 
focus on criminal violations, not civil discoveries of immigration status. ICE can 
determine from information provided, what action it wishes to take or detainers to issue. 
Inclusion of interested parties from the community, from the city/jurisdiction, 
from the agency, the media and others in discussing, drafting and forwarding a policy 
may not completely satisfy all; however, the take-away can be more ‘palatable’ than 
dictated policy efforts. Collaboration, particularly in contentious enforcement issues, 
provides insight difficult to gain outside of such a process. 
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As immigration enforcement efforts are an outgrowth of routine policing efforts 
and focus on community security and criminal enforcement, they are more efficient – part 
of SLT officers’ and deputies’ routine efforts. Immigration related issues like human 
trafficking, violent gangs, drugs, etc., might lead investigative and enforcement efforts, 
but they have a nexus to both criminal and homeland security concerns. 
Implementation of collaborative efforts requires information, training and 
ongoing measures to determine needed adjustments to the policy. It is likely that no 
enforcement policy should be a “one and done” effort. Laws, authorities, priorities and 
communities change. Keeping the same interested parties engaged in monitoring a policy 
is a part of overall collaboration. Implementation is an ongoing effort, not an end to the 
means of arriving at the policy.  
C. OUTCOMES 
Direction and formulation of an SLT agency policy are admittedly as different as 
the communities each agency serves. As has been discussed, policies are influenced by 
laws and controlling regulation, agency capabilities, leadership, and also by politics, 
ideology, and other influences. It is important, yet often difficult find and maintain 
objectivity, while looking critically at policy measures, SLT procedure and outcomes. 
Nonetheless, in an almost overwhelmingly complex problem like immigration 
enforcement, examining a diversity of approaches by the above metrics, and perhaps 
other in future research, may provide clarity to policy makers. Ignoring the issue or at 
least not formulating any policy at all seems counter-intuitive. Throughout the literature 
and research on the issue, the complexity of immigration laws and enforcement is 
discussed. Law enforcement in most jurisdictions contends with volumes of codes, laws 
and regulations its officers and deputies are responsible for enforcing. Complexity is 
inherent in those endeavors and is not a cause to ignore, not enforce, or not provide 
direction. SLT officers and deputies need guidelines and direction in what is an 
admittedly involved issue. 
 
 78
Based on examination of various efforts across numerous SLT agencies, it 
becomes apparent that the complexity requires collaboration to address. While it may 
apply to other policy areas, the expertise and efforts of as many concerned as possible 
will likely lead to a better approach, a stronger policy, and understanding and acceptance. 
Enforcement efforts often take place in a negative context; citations, fines, court 
appearances, and even individuals’ liberty is in play. Almost nowhere is that more 
charged than in immigration enforcement—where possible deportation is a facet. Policy 
that is accepted, understood, and informed by a consensus from those subject to it is 





[B]uilding public trust, and creating expectations of behavior both ways—
what the police expect of immigrants, and what they can expect from the 
police—goes a long way to increasing public safety.  
–LAPD Chief Charlie Beck.263 
A. THERE MUST BE A POLICY 
Law enforcement can lament a lack of federal action for immigration reform, but 
in order to achieve the trust and understanding towards public safety that Chief Beck 
discusses, it is imperative that an SLT agency have a policy. The literature is replete with 
discussion of the complexity of immigration laws and the issue in general. More than 
50% of agencies, not even addressing the issue directly via policy, is unacceptable.264 
Complexity of the issue is not a valid justification for a policy decision, nor is it 
valid for failure to address the issue via policy. SLT agencies and officers deal with 
complex enforcement issues every day; agency policies address many of these 
complexities. Immigration enforcement should be no different. Moreover, leaving 
enforcement decisions to an officer or deputy’s discretion, with no guidance at all will 
undermine trust and public safety. 
Lack of policy guidance has been described as an “abdication of managerial 
responsibility” and has denied “equal protection of the law” because of lack of 
“affirmative guidance” to officers and deputies.265 While discretion in law enforcement is 
vital, even “essential” to law enforcement, lack of policy can lead to discrepancies in 
enforcement amongst personnel, shifts, and beat areas. Sometimes “difficult decisions” 
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are left to the line deputy or officer to intuitively design a response.266  SLT agencies 
should not leave their personnel in those situations. 
B. BUILDING POLICY SHOULD BE COLLABORATIVE 
This seems to be thought of as innovative and a new concept in SLT enforcement 
agencies. Such agencies are typically a cloistered environment to a degree, despite our 
reliance on and work with citizens and the community. There is a perception that citizens 
do not understand the police and vice versa. However, collaboration and consensus, 
despite being the subject of contemporary books and publications, has been topical for 
decades – even if it was ignored. 
Robert M. Igleburger, the Director of Police in Dayton, Ohio in the 1970s was 
among the more innovative chiefs in that era.267 He used citizen task forces to advise 
police policy (little of which existed at the time), polling and meeting with community 
members to address issues and inform policy.268 The effort largely disappeared with 
Igleburger’s retirement in 1973.269 Perhaps Igleburger was ahead of his time. The 
approach may have been virtually forgotten, but that does not diminish its merit. 
Igleburger’s task force approach outlines collaborative efforts that seem to have been 
rediscovered. He suggests the importance of “joint efforts of police-citizen task forces 
where various positions on issues could be discussed and considered.”270 The goal of 
identifying some of the basic elements of a problem and providing realistic guidance 
echoes in efforts like that in Mesa, although there seem to be too few other examples. 
Igleburger saw merit in allowing citizens to participate in “determining police 
practices” indicating that the process was (as it often is now) “closed and not subject to 
scrutiny.”  He and his agency looked at what should be a very basic question, “who, in 
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fact, should determine police enforcement policy in a democratic society?”271 Policy, he 
felt, should be “visible to citizens” subject to review, with participation not resistance at 
its core.272 Igleburger, 40 years ago, recognized the benefit and outlined collaborative 
efforts for law enforcement policy in a time when policy may not have existed at all – 
much as they do not now for immigration enforcement by SLT agencies. It is imperative 
to gain consensus to arrive at the most effective approach. 
On a different front, California SLT agencies and jurisdictions wrestle with a 
contentious issue impacting the state’s communities—Public Safety Realignment under 
AB 109.273 Realignment, as it is commonly referred to, fundamentally changed 
punishments in California for offenses deemed to be non-violent, non-sexual, and non-
repeat offenders.274 It placed many offenders, formerly in state prisons, back into the 
charge of county and local agencies – both in jails and in community based programs. 
While it is not the intent of this research to outline in any depth, the requirements of this 
legislation, it is instructive in terms of the innovative approaches used to meet those 
requirements. 
Community Corrections Partnerships (CCP) are a part of the legislation to 
implement strategies for contending with inmates in local custody as part of realignment. 
While the law that grew out of AB 109 establishes the minimal make-up of the CCP’s 
Executive Committee—Chief of Police, Sheriff, District Attorney, Public Defender, 
Presiding Judge, and Social Services – it does not limit counties’ approaches beyond the 
CCP as to how they will implement realignment and distribute state funding that is part 
of the program. Though each county has a different approach, collaborative efforts in 
Contra Costa County, for example, have included a large cross section from community, 
government, and service organizations. Contra Costa County implemented a Community 
Advisory Board (CAB) to “provide input” on a number of facets that are part of 
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Realignment and rehabilitative efforts.275 The CAB informs plans and policies for the 
county, to include efforts at rehabilitation, community supervision of offenders and other 
issues. It is comprised of a myriad of community members to include; a retired judge, 
workforce development coordinator, domestic violence victim advocates, legal aid 
advocates, residents of county communities, and many others.276This type of cross-
section of community input and expertise not only benefitted the CCP’s efforts, but is 
exemplary of the collaborative efforts that should inform policy in complex areas like 
immigration enforcement. 
There is a great deal at stake in immigration enforcement by SLT agencies, just as 
there is in implementation of new policies in Realignment. Millions of dollars to support 
efforts for rehabilitation have been channeled into Community Based Organizations 
(CBO) in Contra Costa County, as part of Realignment. The CAB’s planning helped 
drive those decisions and will impact how the procedures take shape for years to come. 
Public comment at a Board of Supervisors meeting in Contra Costa County highlights the 
collaboration, as well as the appreciation for being involved in the process by the CBOs 
and the community.   
Chair of the Board of Supervisors, Federal Glover, extolled the efforts of 
collaboration as bringing “bigger bang for our buck” in arriving at decisions and policy. 
Community members and representatives of CBOs discussed the process for Contra 
Costa as approaching “collaboration in new ways” (Rebecca Brown—public comment) 
and maintaining and “open door policy” in implementing community corrections (Dr. 
Edwina Perez-Santiago—public comment).277 
Certainly the issue is unrelated to immigration enforcement by-and-large, 
however, collaborative policy should involve these measures. Realignment attempts to 
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keep offenders out of the state penal system and rehabilitate them in local agencies and in 
the community. Like immigration, this is a divisive issue. Efforts in implementation 
require collaboration and consensus. 
C. BUILD RELATIONSHIPS, AS WELL AS POLICY, WITH AFFECTED 
COMMUNITIES 
Connecting with communities is at the core of effective policing and is a chief 
tenet of community policing in general. Law enforcement officers and agencies require 
cooperation and partnership with the communities they serve, regardless of the 
enforcement issue. Community members need to feel a level of comfort to cooperate with 
SLT officers and to know that their constitutional rights and civil liberties will be upheld. 
Community concerns should “transform vague notions” for cooperation with and support 
for enforcement efforts, to an “involved citizenry.”278 
Fundamental to law enforcement and community policing in any community is 
establishing trust amongst the various ‘publics’ an agency serves – community members, 
organizations, businesses, visitors, etc., is trust. However, we cannot assume that trust 
automatically exists simply because we are the police, the “good guys,” but rather we 
must approach the issue by building trust through communication and joint action.279 
Agency heads will need to go beyond periodic meetings with community 
members or groups and establish processes that engage those groups in problem solving. 
Establishing and formalizing membership, goals and objectives and legitimizing those 
efforts by adopting the resulting input in policy implementation and strategies. 
This process should establish an ideal for membership with the flexibility to 
include new and relevant participants as needed. Publicly announcing and seeking 
participation is critical to the effort. It is not enough to gain participation by membership 
on one side of the debate or the other virtually exclusively. Immigrant advocates, 
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enforcement supporters, business members, clergy, residents, and many others should be 
a part of any board or committee advising the process. This process will be about learning 
and problem solving. The issue of what an agency should or should not do in relation to 
immigration enforcement, as has been discussed above, is by no means a clear-cut or 
decided issue. The issue at the SLT agency level will require public support in strategy 
development as well as implementation – this social learning will be a vital part of the 
process.280 
Some of the specific issues that should be a part of process and strategy 
discussion in the immigration enforcement arena should address (though not be limited 
to)281: 
 Put fears to rest - one of the most useful things local law enforcement can 
do is explain what police do and do not do. For many immigrants, 
reassurance that they will not be detained or deported removes the fear of 
reporting crime. In practice, this could mean telling people any of the 
following that is appropriate in one’s jurisdiction. The department will 
protect crime victims and witnesses regardless of their immigration status, 
targeting only the people who commit crimes. 
 Encourage people to report crime. Immigrants need to be encouraged to 
report crime—and told they can do so anonymously, if necessary. 
Departments should widely publicize the different ways people can report 
crime.  
 Ensure committees are safe zones to foster dialog, both formal and 
informal. The places where police-community interactions happen are 
important. Meetings held in precinct offices, for example, can be 
unsuccessful because few people will attend. Instead  holding such 
meetings should be in neutral settings, such as a local house of worship 
(and asking clergy leaders to promote the meeting with their 
congregations).Schools are also good places to engage immigrant 
communities because parents already go there often and may be 
comfortable with school personnel. Schools might also be enlisted to help 
get a message out from police to families. Another idea is to bring a police 
officer into schools on career day. Establish venues for informal contact, 
as well. Police officers could  team up with staff from the local parks 
department to bring sports equipment to neighborhoods that have few 
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parks or playing fields. Informal contact during, say, a basketball game, 
can give young people a chance to make a positive connection with a 
police officer. When time and resources permit, officers should also be 
encouraged to get out of their car, walk neighborhood streets, and talk 
casually with residents and business owners. They might also attend a 
local soccer game or street fair to get to know people. 
 Maximize efforts like citizens police academies. Many jurisdictions have 
existing citizens’ police academies for educating community members 
about policing. Simply knowing what to do in routine encounters, such as 
a traffic stop, can make interactions go more smoothly. Immigrant 
community leaders and members should be encouraged to attend. 
Attending a citizen’s police academy meeting might enlighten participants 
that they are ‘not dealing with the same kind of police as we were back 
home.’  Citizens’ police academies can be customized: a New Americans’ 
Academy for immigrants and refugees, a Teen Academy, a Hispanic 
Citizens Police Academy, etc.—with encouragement for citizens from 
non-immigrant communities or backgrounds to attend.282  
 Most SLT agencies maintain volunteer groups within their ranks. Radio 
operators, search and rescue personnel, reserve officers and deputies, 
clergy—all give of their time and expertise to augment what would 
otherwise be limited resources of an agency’s response. Members of 
affected communities should be encouraged to volunteer to assist SLT 
enforcement efforts. Specific volunteer resources/units to reach out with 
translation services, assistance to potential victims, community resources 
etc., will contribute to successful efforts while demonstrating the 
legitimacy and security of law enforcement to immigrant communities 
who may not have experienced positive relationships in their countries of 
origin. 
D. BUILD NEW APPROACHES 
1. Consider Actions Closer to Communities 
There is distance and dissonance amongst SLT as well as federal immigration 
enforcement efforts, immigrant communities and advocacy groups, and groups or citizens 
who support and petition for stricter enforcement in the immigration arena. A lack of 
understanding and collaboration due to that distance might be assuaged by localizing 
efforts, rather than exclusively federalizing them. Some joint efforts like those in Mesa 
and Escondido go part way in this endeavor.  
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In the United Kingdom (UK)  a key strategy of immigration enforcement efforts, 
in the fairly recent past, moved to close “distance” of immigration enforcement by not 
only crime fighting and enforcement efforts, but by co-locating nearly 8,000 immigration 
officers to work with local police, in the communities, in these new “crime partnership” 
schemes.283 Further focusing on the local level and local enforcement, is a geographically 
organized employment of Local Immigration Teams (LIT) across all regions of the UK.   
Overall there are 70–80 such teams, committing approximately 8,000 UK Border Agency 
(UKBA) staff to the local immigration effort.284 The focus of these teams is local 
immigration issues, community concerns, and prevention and early intervention of issues. 
Uniquely, they look to mimic the relationships forged by local police amongst the 
community through their “neighborhood policing model.”285 The LITs cooperate with 
local police in a “clear mission to focus on local immigration crime.”286  This seems to 
speak to a realization that, at least at the local level, the focus is on criminality in relation 
to, and among, immigrants without as great an emphasis on illegal immigration itself; and 
closing the distance between immigration enforcement and the community. This 
approach seems to create a greater level of overall effectiveness, as parliamentary 
representatives in one region in the UK put it: 
[T]he local team had been extremely helpful, including holding meetings 
with them to establish a constructive and supportive relationship. They felt 
that the value of having an immediate central contact with whom to 
discuss any area of immigration could not be overestimated; and the 
ability to get a rapid response to an urgent enquiry had enabled their office 
to provide a better service to their constituent.287 
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Implementation of a ‘flatter’ immigration partnership and enforcement strategy 
among federal and SLT agencies would bring these efforts more in line with the 
community policing concepts practices by most SLT agencies across the country. While 
it is understood that such efforts are not entirely the decision of a local agency, the 
concept is not entirely without precedent as semi-permanent or permanent partnerships 
amongst SLT and federal agencies has occurred in other quarters. Among the more 
prevalent are narcotics and organized crime enforcement task forces displaying models 
somewhat similar to an LIT/co-located approach. 
2. Create Specialized Units 
Develop and implement model for specialized units with SLT agencies can, on a 
day-to-day basis, promote better understanding, communication and collaboration with 
immigrant communities in settings not aimed at criminal enforcement per se. Most 
agencies maintain and officer or unit aimed at crime prevention efforts on a full or part 
time basis. A facet of such efforts can and should focus on areas with large immigrant 
populations specifically. Bringing line-level enforcement officers into those communities 
with a mission besides routine enforcement positively engages them.  
There are examples like Metropolitan Nashville Police Department’s El Protector 
program, which deploys two dedicated officers who engage the Hispanic community in 
efforts that emphasize crime prevention and education about the role of law enforcement.. 
Those assigned run specialized initiatives. For example, they conducted safety 
inspections for children’s car seats, explaining the law and providing car seats to needy 
families. The program also enlists immigrant communities’ help to solve crimes. A crime 
videotaped in a Latino-owned store, for example, can be sent to one of the officers, who 
forwards it to contacts in the community. The contacts can keep an eye out for the 
perpetrator, both to protect themselves and to help identify the suspect.288 
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3. Create Allied Approach—Regionally 
State, county and municipal boundaries are very much imaginary. There are 
rarely, if ever, physical indicators designating jurisdictions. Day-to-day enforcement 
activities are not constrained to a give city, county or sometimes states. Pursuits meander 
through a multiplicity of jurisdictions. Cross-jurisdictional partnerships and enforcement 
teams are fairly commonplace for narcotics enforcement, drunk-driving efforts, and even 
training efforts are shared regionally. In fact, a majority of local police departments 
serving 10,000 or more residents had sworn personnel assigned to a multiagency drug 
task force during 2007.289 
Enforcement efforts and relationships amongst immigrant communities and in any 
immigration enforcement efforts similarly cross these arbitrary boundaries. Immigrant 
communities may live work and play across several areas. 
Communication and subsequent understanding should be developed amongst SLT 
agencies in efforts in immigrant communities. Agency heads and staff will lead efforts to 
establish this communication and share resources, staff, material or insight regionally. 
Training and meeting with community groups and interested parties should take place 
regularly to develop relationships, guide enforcement efforts, and provide continuing 
feedback to determine where there is success or need for improvement.  
Police agencies can increase their effectiveness through consulting, collaboration, 
and innovation.290 Creating innovative, multi-jurisdictional, approaches to training and 
preparing officers and deputies amongst agencies sharing regional concerns exploits the 
knowledge base that exists. No one agency likely has the staffing or expertise for all 
issues, including matters of enforcement in immigration and immigrant communities. 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) is a fairly established model focusing on causal factors 
of crime and disorder that can be enhanced by a regional approach to training and 
enforcement. Training officers with active caseloads from combined agencies could 
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demonstrate POP techniques and strategies to trainees as they work together on actual 
projects and issues amongst immigrant populations as well.291 
E. FINAL ANALYSIS—BUILD NEW PARTNERSHIPS—THREE SIDES OF 
THE PYRAMID 
No longer will it be enough for each criminal justice partner to focus on its 
own distinct mission within the justice system. Achievement [of goals] 
will depend on the commitment and collaboration of all justice partners 
towards a combined mission.292 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Immigration Enforcement Collaborative 
The above quote from the Executive Committee of Contra Costa County 
Community Corrections Partnership’s Implementation Plan, while speaking of 
Realignment, summarizes the attitude necessary in the approach to challenging policy 
issues facing SLT agencies - to include immigration enforcement. Included among 
“justice partners” in Realignment are community members and organizations. The 
approach in immigration enforcement policymaking must also include community input. 
The other essential sides to the pyramid are SLT agencies themselves, and the federal 
components of immigration enforcement. 
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As discussed, the federal government maintains primacy in establishing United 
States immigration laws. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that States or other government 
entities cannot enact immigration laws that conflict with this federal authority. In the 
same decision, the Court concluded that SLT entities could involve themselves in 
investigation and enforcement of immigration laws. In fact, they could be required to do 
so.293 Nonetheless, SLT efforts come in cooperation with ICE and other federal 
immigration authorities to properly carry out enforcement actions. Likewise, ICE and 
other federal authorities’ efforts are augmented by appropriate involvement of SLT 
agencies. 
SLT enforcement agencies face the challenge of maintaining law and order, as 
well as relationships, in their respective communities. Beyond that, however, in post-9/11 
America, SLT agencies are part of the fabric of homeland security efforts and enterprises. 
For reasons previously discussed law enforcement is among the more ubiquitous 
components of homeland security. Routine efforts and duties make SLT agencies the 
“force multiplier” that can thwart broader threats to national security, often without it 
being apparent.294 The 9/11 Commission report also acknowledges SLT enforcement’s 
criticality in homeland security. Ignoring this capacity in appropriate cooperation in 
immigration enforcement at some level (or at least addressing it as part of agencies’ 
policy efforts) is counter-intuitive.  
Citizens, advocacy groups on both sides of the immigration issue, immigrant 
communities, and other interested constituencies desire government policies, to include 
law enforcement policies, reflective of their interests and viewpoints. They rightfully 
seek a means to be heard on salient issues. Immigration enforcement and related policies 
is certainly one of them. Public comment at official meetings and other sanctioned means 
of input are essential, but not enough. Those mechanisms are rarely able to achieve the 
direct input to inform policies and procedures in the bureaucracies of SLT agencies and 
administrations. There is a perception that such input is heard but not acted upon in an 
appreciable way. Policies are ultimately made outside of public scrutiny or input, and 
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enacted with little or no communication or education. A seat at the table, making 
identified groups a part of a collaborative process, while challenging, can better inform 
policy decisions. 
Examples abound of current efforts that are flawed for lack of collaboration 
among all three sides of the pyramid. Secure Communities has become one of the 
primary initiatives of ICE in immigration enforcement, particularly as it relates to 
cooperation with SLT agencies. While the federal components, along with many SLT 
agencies involved implicitly understand and support Secure Communities, the 
community component is lacking. Confusion and misinformation has plagued the effort 
almost since its inception.295 SLT agencies cooperating with Secure Communities, 
particularly those that have agreements to house detainees, are left to contend with the 
outgrowth of the confusion. ICE tends to distance itself not only from implementation but 
from communication, referring community questions or concerns to contact a 
Washington, D.C., office for inquiries of issues occurring locally. This generally leaves 
the SLT component to work with the community inquiries, playing go-between, and 
generally giving the appearance of being less than direct or open. Those same SLT 
agencies then suffer from potentially damaged relationships and flagging support.  
SLT agencies ironically work at arm’s length very often from the communities 
they serve. This is especially true administratively and almost certainly from the policy 
perspective. Policy makers are not community officers and vice-versa. Chiefs and 
Sheriffs and their executive managers are busy in their duties but are also insulated from 
the communities for whom they are directing policy and procedure. While community 
policing models include frequent meetings in the community, generally they are not 
intended to include actual policy discussion, formation and implementation. Though 
important, most of them are a dialog for ongoing concerns between officers and 
community members; only occasionally do they take place inclusive of executive 
management and virtually never with federal authorities. Broadening engagement with 
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the community to include policy making, where necessary, will inform and educate all 
involved and can result in a product that is wholly more acceptable to those concerned. 
The complexity of the immigration issue is clear. Gaining insight from affected 
community members, including SLT and federal authorities in the discussion and 
implementation, can illuminate facets that might otherwise be missed.  
Community members and interest groups with a stake in, or passion for, the 
immigration enforcement issue can also be insular in nature. While their perspective is 
not necessarily flawed, it may be myopic. Exposure to the nature of SLT and federal 
enforcement efforts and procedures can dispel misgivings about the approaches and 
provide improvements to achieve success. Much discussion has been had about fear 
amongst immigrant communities towards law enforcement. The nature of law 
enforcement in their countries of origin may contribute to fear and lack of cooperation. 
Exposure to law enforcement through input to inform policy can remove some of the 
barriers created – and remove the fear. SLT agencies, along with federal authorities 
should implement inclusive practices when arriving at procedures that impact SLT 
communities. Immigrant communities do not want to be victimized by criminals or 
subject to violence or abuse. If SLT enforcement providers are unfamiliar and 
misunderstood by those communities, they will likely retreat from those meant to help 
them. SLT and Federal authorities will find it more difficult to achieve the best approach 
absent cooperation of those same communities.  
If we accept that each of the three components is important individually – federal 
primacy and  federal immigration enforcement efforts to protect national security, SLT 
enforcement’s vital role in both in their law and order role in the community but as a 
homeland security component, and fundamental necessity of community members and 
advocates to influence the environment of their communities (inclusive of law 
enforcement); then it would follow that it is perhaps more important that these elements 
function collaboratively. Emphasis on one area or component without consideration for 
the others almost certainly will not achieve any level of synergy in an issue as 
contentious as immigration enforcement. None of these components exist in a vacuum, 
 93
nor do the enforcement efforts in the field. Complex policy should not be created in a 
vacuum; absent collaboration and consensus. 
Disparate groups can come together in efforts that are palatable to all involved, 
much like the efforts to achieve consensus for Realignment policy. It is likely, the results 
will be vastly more effective. Resources can be found and allocated that otherwise would 
not have been evident. A sense of ownership of the outcomes can aid in cooperation. The 
enforcement sides of the pyramid, federal or local, operating less like adversaries and 
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